Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 63

Issue 3

Article 4

2013

Trademark Owner as Adverse Possessor: Productive Use and
Property Acquisition
Jake Linford

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Jake Linford, Trademark Owner as Adverse Possessor: Productive Use and Property Acquisition, 63 Case
W. Rsrv. L. Rev. 703 (2013)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol63/iss3/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an
authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 3 ·2013

Trademark Owner as
Adverse Possessor:
Productive Use and
Property Acquisition
Jake Linford †
Abstract
There is an ongoing debate over whether or not a trademark is
“property,” and what the appropriate boundaries of such a property right
might be. Some scholars assert that rules and justifications developed to
handle rights in real property are generally a poor fit for intellectual
property regimes and for trademark protection in particular. Others
respond that a unified theory of property should be able to account for
both real and intellectual property. Neither approach fully recognizes
that property regimes are multifaceted. A close look at the critical
features of particular regimes can pay unexpected dividends.
This Article reveals how the process of trademark acquisition
resembles, in startling ways, acquiring title to real property through
adverse possession. Both the trademark and adverse possession regimes
base acquisition on the productive use of the property in question. This
productive use must be sufficient to provide notice of the asserted
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property right to the public and competing claimants. A properly
functioning productive use regime is valuable because such a regime is
more likely to encourage an efficient initial allocation of property rights
while also providing fairness-based limits on the scope of property
rights. Recognizing the productive use structure in both regimes
provides several significant insights. First, the productive use structure
highlights the importance of the commercial strength inquiry as a usebased limitation on the scope of protection even for inherently
distinctive marks. Second, the productive use structure also clarifies
how and why rights in the trademark commons are more active and
property-like than rights held in common over expired patents and
copyrights. Third, comparing the regimes shows how adverse possession
is, surprisingly, a more hard-edged or “crystalline” property regime
than the relatively “muddy” trademark regime. Finally, this analysis
inspires interventions for trademark and adverse possession law to bring
them more in line with the productive use requirement, and to open
space for public use and competition.
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Introduction
In longstanding tradition, American courts have analogized
trademark protection to property rights developed at common law. 1
The question of whether they should do so has recently preoccupied
the legal academy, 2 part of a larger debate about whether it is proper
to view intellectual property through a real property lens and whether
comparing intellectual property regimes to real property regimes gets
us anywhere. Mark Lemley has led the charge in arguing that
intellectual property is sui generis, with unique characteristics that
make it unnecessary to “turn to some broader area of legal theory to
seek legitimacy.” 3 Under this sui generis framework, it is useless to
apply “inapposite economic analysis borrowed from the very different
case of land” to intellectual property. 4 Scholars like John Duffy, by
contrast, argue that identifying a “unified theory of property—one
broad enough to account for the similarities and differences among
species of property as diverse as Blackacre and patents—promises to
increase rather than to diminish our understanding of property and
intellectual property.” 5 Neither approach explicitly recognizes that
1.

See, e.g., Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 92 (1879) (“The right to
adopt and use a symbol or a device to distinguish the goods or property
made or sold by the person whose mark it is, to the exclusion of use by
all other persons, has long been recognized by the common law . . . . It
is a property right for the violation of which damages may be recovered
in an action at law . . . .”).

2.

Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83
Tex. L. Rev. 1031, 1042 (2005) [hereinafter Lemley, Free Riding]
(“Trademark law, which was once limited to protecting against consumer
confusion, has increasingly taken on the character of a property right,
with the result that trademark ‘owners’ now have the power to prevent
various kinds of uses of their marks, regardless of whether consumers will
be confused or search costs increased.”). But see Mark P. McKenna, The
Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 Notre Dame L. Rev.
1839, 1848 (2007) (“American courts from the very beginning protected
producers from illegitimate diversions of their trade by recognizing
property rights.”).

3.

Lemley, Free Riding, supra note 2, at 1075.

4.

Id. More specifically, Lemley has argued that if intellectual property is a
coherent category, trademark protection falls outside it. Mark A.
Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108
Yale L.J. 1687, 1695 (1999) [hereinafter Lemley, Lanham Act] (“Even
if one accepts [that patents and copyrights are analogous to real
property], it does not carry over to trademarks. The justifications for
trademark law are different from those for other forms of intellectual
property.” (footnote omitted)).

5.

John F. Duffy, Comment, Intellectual Property Isolationism and the
Average Cost Thesis, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 1077, 1078 (2005). Some see the
comparison between intellectual property and real property as a means
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real property regimes are multifaceted. Valuable results are more
likely when we compare the “right” real property regime to the
“right” intellectual property regime—when the regimes compared
share not only similar structures but similar policy justifications.
For example, one of the problems in analogizing trademark
acquisition to rights in real property is that trademark acquisition, as
it developed in the common law, is not a pure first-in-time regime.
Instead, acquiring a trademark requires productive use of a given
word, symbol, or other identifier as a trademark—a source signifier.
Such use is generally not necessary to acquire rights in real property,
with at least one important exception: adverse possession is also a
regime with a productive use requirement. 6 As this Article argues, the
parallels between acquiring real property through adverse possession
and acquiring rights to the exclusive use of trademarks are substantial
and instructive: both doctrinal regimes manifest a purpose to provide
notice to the public and competing claimants through productive use.

to expand intellectual property protections, while others see it as
providing a rationale for constraining them. Compare Lemley, Lanham
Act, supra note 4, at 1697 (“Courts seem to be replacing the traditional
rationale for trademark law with a conception of trademarks as property
rights, in which trademark ‘owners’ are given strong rights over the
marks without much regard for the social costs of such rights.”), with
David Fagundes, Property Rhetoric and the Public Domain, 94 Minn.
L. Rev. 652, 657 (2010) (asserting that property rhetoric can “explicitly
present public entitlements in information as a subject of [collective or
public] ownership” to “provide[ ] needed pushback against the powerful
but overly broad claims of rights in information that are commonly
made” regarding copyright).
6.

A handful of cases and scholars have compared trademark ownership
and adverse possession in three more limited ways. First, courts in the
early part of the twentieth century compared the junior user’s laches
defense—that the plaintiff “slept on his rights” for too long and now
cannot enforce them—to an adverse possession defense against an
ejectment claim. See, e.g., Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Du Bois Brewing
Co., 175 F.2d 370, 374 (3d Cir. 1949). But see infra note 177 (discussing
problems with the analogy between a junior user and an adverse
possessor). Second, scholars have suggested in passing that the
trademark owner takes a defensive posture against encroachment similar
to that taken by a real property owner to forestall adverse possession.
See, e.g., Laura A. Heymann, The Grammar of Trademarks, 14 Lewis
& Clark L. Rev. 1313, 1318 (2010) (describing trademark enforcement
as “akin to thwarting adverse possession” in that the trademark “must be
defended against any and all encroachments”). Finally, the acquisition of
an incontestable registration, which can occur after five consecutive years
of continuous use of a registered trademark, has been likened to adverse
possession, due to its temporal component, but criticized as otherwise
lacking. See, e.g., Suman Naresh, Incontestability and Rights in
Descriptive Trademarks, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 953, 982–85 (1986). While
these comparisons are apt, they miss the larger picture.
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This productive use is in turn notice providing, 7 meaning generating,8
boundary setting, 9 abuse limiting, 10 and value creating. 11
A productive use requirement is desirable in both regimes for
three interlocking reasons. First, requiring productive use makes it
more likely that the initial allotment of property rights is more
efficient than other potential allocations. 12 Second, productive use
provides a fairness-based limitation on the scope of property rights,
making sure both that the initial possessor has done something to
merit the property right and allowing for necessary reallocation when
the productive use of a subsequent claimant outstrips the productive
use of the initial claimant. 13 Third, productive use regimes are
communicative and information forcing, delineating the boundaries of
the property right at issue. Property seekers, competing claimants,
and the public all receive notice from and provide notice to one
another in regimes that require productive use. 14
Part I of this Article discusses the main similarities between the
trademark and adverse possession regimes. Part I.D explains how the
acquisition of rights in descriptive marks most clearly resembles adverse
possession. Part II.A explains how the rights in inherently distinctive
marks are also dependent on productive use. Part II.B clears up the
hostility misnomer that has crept into claim of right analysis in adverse
possession doctrine, while Part II.C explains how the comparison to
adverse possession’s exclusivity requirement helps circumscribe the
rights acquired by the trademark owner. Part III discusses the role
played by productive public use in the creation and expiration of
trademark rights. Part IV focuses on several critical differences between
the regimes to highlight how adverse possession is, surprisingly, a more
hard-edged or “crystalline” property regime—in the sense first used by
Carol Rose 15—than the relatively “muddy” trademark regime.
Recognizing the central importance of productive use highlights how
both regimes have gone strayed from their productive use foundations.
Part V recommends interventions to bring them back in line.
7.

See infra Part I.

8.

See infra Parts II.A, III; notes 30–35 and accompanying text.

9.

See infra notes 95–96, 135–136 and accompanying text.

10.

See infra notes 235–237 and accompanying text.

11.

See infra notes 216–24, 281–82, and accompanying text.

12.

See infra Part IV.C; notes 53–54 and accompanying text.

13.

See infra Parts II.A, IV.A; notes 62–63, 76 and accompanying text.

14.

See infra Parts I, III, V.A.

15.

Carol Rose labeled imprecise or fuzzy property regimes as “muddy,”
compared with clearer “crystalline” property regimes. Carol M. Rose,
Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 577, 577–80
(1988) [hereinafter Rose, Crystals].
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I.

The Notice Function of Productive Use

Adverse possession and the law protecting trademarks are
property regimes that are more similar than one might at first
imagine. At their core, trademark law and adverse possession are both
communicative regimes, but that communication with the public,
competitors, and other potential claimants is carried out via productive
use of the property at issue. Bringing the property to productive use is
valuable because the use itself provides an indication of the
boundaries of the property, and simultaneously requires some
evidence that the claimant has acted openly, as an owner should.
For example, the adverse possessor who operates under color of
title or puts a fence around the property provides information about
how she values the property and indicates that she has gone to some
length in signaling that interest to the record owner and other
competitors for the property. Initial steps like fencing lead to a
transfer of title, however, only when the adverse possessor also
engages in continuous and exclusive use over time. 16 She must act like
an owner, and persistently doing so leads the public to treat her like
one. Adverse possession is also information forcing. 17 By entering the
property and subjecting it to use, the adverse possessor puts the
record owner on notice that there are competing claims to the
property, and the record owner should step in to clarify the
boundaries of the property, or risk losing her claim.
Like adverse possession, trademark use is also communicative and
information forcing. Consumers come to understand the scope of the
mark owner’s claim as the mark is used in commerce to designate
goods and services from a consistent source. Competitors are also
notified of the trademark owner’s claim through her productive use. 18
This Part describes these similarities in more detail. Part I.A
briefly describes the trademark and adverse possession regimes. Part
I.B compares aspects of the trademark and adverse possession regimes
that require actual, open, and notorious possession from the respective
claimants and summarizes the traditional justifications for trademark
ownership and adverse possession in light of the productive use
requirement. Part I.C describes how trademark registration acts like
16.

See infra Part I.C.

17.

See Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 73, 78–79 (1985) [hereinafter Rose, Possession] (discussing how
possession of property requires communication by the original claimant
to others who may be interested in the property, lest he lose it to those
individuals through adverse possession); see also Abraham Bell &
Gideon Parchomovsky, Pliability Rules, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 57 (2002)
(noting the desirable effects of information forcing with the “dual
functions of ‘quieting titles’ and facilitating transactions”).

18.

See infra note 65 and accompanying text.
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color of title or fencing the property—incentivizing activity that
enhances notice to the public without stripping the productive use
requirement. Part I.D analyzes in detail the similarities between the
continuous use requirement in adverse possession and the acquired
distinctiveness requirement in trademark law.
A.

The Basics of Adverse Possession and Trademark Acquisition

As a matter of black letter law, there are five elements of a
successful adverse possession claim, and each element manifests an
aspect of the notice function of productive use. First, there must be
actual entry. 19 The adverse possessor can generally claim only so much
land as was possessed and converted to use. 20 Second, the use must be
notorious—something the reasonably attentive landowner would
notice if she were paying attention. 21 Third, the adverse possessor
must engage in exclusive possession of the property. 22 Fourth, that
possession must be under claim of right, or in other words, without
permission. 23 Fifth and finally, each state prescribes by statute the
amount of time for which the adverse possessor must continuously
possess the property, without ejectment, in order to secure title. 24 If the
adverse possessor successfully engages in exclusive use of the property
for the statutory period, she can quiet title, or in the alternative,
prevail against an action for ejectment by the title owner. 25
Trademark acquisition also hinges on notice-providing productive
use. The right to use a trademark exclusively is obtained, under the
U.S. system, but not through mere initial adoption. 26 Instead, the
19.

See infra Part I.B.

20.

Joseph William Singer, Introduction to Property § 4.2.1, at 146
(2d ed. 2005).

21.

8 Richard R. Powell, Powell on Real Property § P6.08[3][c]
(Michael Allen Wolf ed., 2012) (stating, as a matter of public policy, “the
owner should not lose his or her land without some reasonable warning that
should have made the owner aware that adverse possession was occurring”).

22.

See discussion infra Part II.C.

23.

See discussion infra Part II.B.

24.

For example, California has a five-year statutory window, Cal. Civ.
Proc. Code §§ 321, 322 (West 2006), while Iowa requires continuous
possession for forty years. Iowa Code § 614.31 (2013). This Article
primarily compares U.S. trademark law with the adverse possession
regimes in the various states.

25.

R.H. Helmholz, More on Subjective Intent: A Response to Professor
Cunningham, 64 Wash. U. L.Q. 65, 67 n.6 (1986) (“[T]he requirements
for gaining title by adverse possession do not vary according to the form
of [the] action.”).

26.

Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879) (“[T]he exclusive right to [a
trademark] grows out of its use, and not its mere adoption.”).

709

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 3 ·2013
Trademark Owner as Adverse Possessor

trademark owner establishes her rights through the use of a given
word or symbol to designate a source for goods or services. 27 This
productive use infuses the mark with communicative value. 28
Trademarks are often grouped into categories, based on the initial
suitability of the word or symbol chosen for trademark protection.
Some words are seen as inherently distinctive—inherently capable of
carrying trademark meaning—because the word chosen is not directly
related to the product or service offered for sale. For inherently
distinctive marks—like XEROX, a fanciful mark for photocopiers,
APPLE, an arbitrary mark for computers, and GLEEM, a suggestive
mark for toothpaste—federal trademark protection is granted
automatically upon “the bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary
course of trade, and not made merely to reserve a right in a mark.” 29
Other words are more descriptive of the product. For these
descriptive terms, initial use of a descriptive mark—like SEALTIGHT
for self-sealing fasteners—secures no priority over other users of
identical or similar marks until the descriptive term acquires
distinctiveness. 30 Descriptive terms do not initially signal source, so
significance to consumers, “secondary meaning” or “acquired
distinctiveness,” must be developed. 31 For example, a term like
TASTY for apples describes a characteristic of the goods sold, and is
27.

Any given word or symbol can have many meanings. Linguists refer to a
particular meaning of a word as a lexeme. One string of letters (or
sounds), like “delta,” can have multiple meanings: the fourth letter of
the Greek alphabet; the triangle-shaped “tract of alluvial land enclosed
and traversed by the diverging mouths of the Nile”; or an arrangement
of three electrical windings. 4 Oxford English Dictionary 426 (2d
ed. 1989). Each meaning is a lexeme. Different trademarks can be
derived from the same string of letters or sounds, like “DELTA,” for
airlines; faucets; or fine writing instruments. Thus, the use of a
preexisting word or symbol as a mark creates a new meaning for that
word or symbol in its use as a mark. Each use of a word or symbol as a
mark to signify goods or services from a particular source creates a new
“trademark lexeme.” See infra Part II.C.

28.

Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth Century:
The Development of the Modern Concept of Property, 29 Buff. L.
Rev. 325, 345 (1980).

29.

15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) (defining “use in commerce”). See also 2 J.
Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair
Competition § 16:8 (4th ed. 2007) (noting that the definition of “use”
was changed to “require a greater degree of activity”). The provisions
codifying federal trademark protection are commonly known as the
Lanham Act.

30.

See, e.g., Calvin Klein Co. v. Farah Mfg. Co., 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 795,
803 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (discussing the importance that a trademark is
“truly distinctive” to support a cause of action).

31.

See 2 McCarthy, supra note 29, § 15:10 (noting the use of “ ‘acquired
distinctiveness’ as a synonym for secondary meaning”).
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thus merely descriptive and unprotectable until the TASTY mark
acquires secondary meaning, that is, until consumers come to
interpret the mark as a designation of the source of the apples sold
under the mark. 32
Productive use of a descriptive mark builds secondary meaning,
but productive use is required to develop commercial strength in any
mark. 33 Thus, even an inherently distinctive mark must be consistently
and continually used in commerce or the mark may be deemed
effectively unenforceable, if not outright abandoned. 34 A failure to use
the mark in commerce will result in the mark falling into the public
domain for subsequent appropriation by another for trademark use. 35
Some terms can never be protected as trademarks. A term that a
court concludes is ex ante generic for the genus of goods or services,
like COMPUTER for computers, may never be transformed into a
trademark, even if consumers should come to associate the generic
terms with a particular good or service from a particular source. 36
32.

Professor McCarthy divides marks into those business symbols that are
inherently distinctive and those that are not. He refers to the latter category
as “secondary meaning marks.” See, e.g., id. § 16:34. As this Article
describes in more detail in Part II.A, there is little real difference between
the commercial strength required to enforce even inherently distinctive
marks and the secondary meaning required to show a descriptive term has
become enforceable. Thus, while the term “descriptive mark” is something
of a misnomer, this Article uses it as a placeholder for “secondary meaning
mark” or the more accurate but fatally unwieldy “descriptive term that has
acquired distinctiveness.”

33.

See infra Part II.A. But see Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Owning
Mark(et)s, 109 Mich. L. Rev. 137, 182–83 (2010) (criticizing natural rights
theories for basing trademark rights on productive use as divorced from the
market in which the owner offers goods under the mark).

34.

See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (defining “abandonment”); Exxon Corp. v.
Humble Exploration Co., 695 F.2d 96, 100 (5th Cir. 1983) (discussing
the requirement of continued use of a mark under the Lanham Act to
“avoid a finding of abandonment”); 2 McCarthy, supra note 29, § 16:9
(“Prior and continuous usage is required.”).

35.

Professor McCarthy describes the public domain as follows:
“ ‘[P]ublic domain’ is the status of an invention, creative work,
commercial symbol, or any other creation that is not protected by any
form of intellectual property. Public domain is the rule: intellectual
property is the exception.” 1 McCarthy, supra note 29, § 1.2 (quoting
J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy’s Desk Encyclopedia of
Intellectual Property 354 (2d. ed. 1995)).

36.

See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d
Cir. 1976) (holding that generic terms “cannot [be] transform[ed] . . .
into a subject for trademark”); see also infra Part IV.A. In addition, a
source-signifying mark can become generic ex post if its primary
significance to the public shifts to indicate the genus of goods or
services, rather than signifying a source of particular goods or services.
See infra Part III.
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A trademark owner may successfully enjoin the use of the mark
by a junior user, where the owner can establish the new use is likely
to confuse consumers. Injunctive relief is common; damages are less
so. 37 And while use in commerce is the means to acquire rights in a
trademark, the scope of what is protected is determined only in
comparison to the use engaged in by others. The scope of protection is
often fully defined only in litigating the question of likelihood of
confusion, where courts apply a “muddy” multifactor test. 38
There are three key commonalities in the trademark acquisition
and adverse possession regimes. First, both regimes require the
acquiring property owner to engage in productive use of the property
at issue. Second, in both regimes, that productive use fulfills a notice
function that informs record owners, competitors, and the public
about the scope of the asserted claim. Third, both regimes are
concerned with the relative or comparative value of asserted rights.
While trademark acquisition looks like a first-in-time property regime,
the mark owner must establish rights against other comers via use in
commerce. 39 Being first to adopt a mark is not enough. 40 With the
exception of fanciful marks, every trademark is drawn from words or
symbols with preexistent meaning, to which the public and competitors have varying claims. 41 And while adverse possession is a
means of property reallocation, there are important similarities
between the requirements an adverse possessor must meet to acquire
property from a title owner and the productive labor that justifies
property ownership. 42 Like the trademark owner, the adverse
37.

For example, while damages for past infringement are waived where the
defendant raises a successful laches defense, injunctive relief will only be
barred if the plaintiff is guilty of “gross laches.” Univ. of Pittsburgh v.
Champion Prods., Inc., 686 F.2d 1040, 1044–45 (3d Cir. 1982). A junior
user who engages in the productive use necessary to develop trademark
rights can thus earn immunity to a future claim by senior user if the use
is tolerated for too long. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Du Bois Brewing Co.,
175 F.2d 370, 374 (3d Cir. 1949). Nevertheless, the junior trademark user
cannot entirely deprive the senior user of her rights in the mark, no
matter the relative value of their respective uses. See also infra note 177.

38.

See, e.g., Joseph P. Liu, Two-Factor Fair Use?, 31 Colum. J.L. &
Arts 571, 574–75 (2008) (presenting the multifactor likelihood-ofconfusion test used to determine trademark infringement as an exemplar
of the typical difficulty of determining which if any factors are
dispositive and how they should be weighed).

39.

See infra Parts I.D, II.A.

40.

See Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879) (“[T]he exclusive right to
[a trademark] grows out of its use, and not its mere adoption.”).

41.

See infra Part III.

42.

See generally Eric R. Claeys, Locke Unlocked: Productive Use in
Trespass, Adverse Possession, and Labor Theory 53 (George Mason
Univ. Law. & Econ. Research. Paper Series, Paper No. 12-21, 2012),
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possessor must signal her claim not only to the title owner, but to
the entire world. 43
The similarities between the adverse possession and trademark
acquisition regimes are most apparent when comparing adverse
possession’s requirements of actual entry, open and notorious
possession, and continuous use with similar requirements in trademark
law. As developed in the next two subparts, these similarities
highlight how both regimes base the acquisition of property rights on
productive use that communicates the property claim to the public
and potential competitors.
B.

The Notice Function of Open and Notorious Possession

In order to claim real property through adverse possession, there
must be actual entry, that is to say, “the possessor must physically
occupy the premises in some manner.” 44 Adverse possession must not
only be actual, but also open and notorious. Such use provides notice
to the record owner sufficient to ascertain whether she values the
property as much as the possessor does. 45 Failing to notice open and
notorious adverse possession is a signal that the record owner holds
the property in somewhat lower esteem than the possessor, or at least
that her need for it is less immediate. Generally, courts look to the
typical use to which property of that type is put. 46 Where the adverse
possessor occupies part of a pre-existing parcel, she will generally
prevail in claiming title only to the part of the parcel where
productive use takes place. 47

available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1759551 (noting that productive
labor theory conditions property ownership on “a responsibility to
‘enjoy’ ” and make use of the property).
43.

See Pillow v. Roberts, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 472, 477 (1851) (“[C]olor of title
. . . has always been received as evidence that the person in possession
claims for himself, and of course, adversely to all the world.”).

44.

Singer, supra note 20, § 4.2.1, at 145.

45.

See Eduardo Moisés Peñalver & Sonia K. Katyal, Property
Outlaws 129 (2010) (noting that, in adverse possession, the law infers
that “the lawbreaker places a higher value on property than its true
owner does”); Rose, Possession, supra note 17, at 80–81 (noting that the
burden of correcting the misapprehension of the adverse possessor falls
on the actual owner).

46.

See, e.g., Smith v. Hayden, 772 P.2d 47, 55 (Colo. 1989) (in banc)
(“[A]ctual occupancy means the ordinary use to which the land is
capable and such as an owner would make of it.” (quoting Anderson v.
Cold Spring Tungsten, Inc., 458 P.2d 756, 759 (Colo. 1969))).

47.

Crowley v. Whitesell, 702 S.W.2d 127, 128 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985)
(typically, adverse possessors “must prove actual possession of the
entire tract”).
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Adverse possession of real property is typically justified on one of
three interlocking grounds: settling claims, 48 the demerit of the title
owner, 49 and the merit of the adverse possessor. 50 While the claimsettling justification operates like a statute of limitations to bring
finality to property disputes, the demerit and merit rationales seek to
justify the actual transfer of title from the record owner to the
adverse possessor. The merit rationale has historically been seen as
the weakest of the three justifications for adverse possession, 51 but
recognizing the notice function of productive use at the core of
adverse possession reaffirms the importance of the merit rationale.
The English common law discounted the merit of the adverse
possessor, 52 but it cannot be the case that the demerit of the property
owner is sufficient justification for the transfer of title. If the law merely
sought to dispossess inattentive record owners, an abandonment regime
would work just as well. 53 Such a regime could properly consider the
evidence that the record owner failed to secure the property or
otherwise put it to reasonably productive use in the community.
48.

Henry W. Ballantine, Title by Adverse Possession, 32 Harv. L. Rev.
135, 135 (1918) (arguing that adverse possession has no goal of
rewarding the diligent trespasser or penalizing the sleeping owner but
that “the great purpose” is simply to quiet title, prove meritorious titles,
and correct conveyancing errors).

49.

See Lee Anne Fennell, Efficient Trespass: The Case for “Bad Faith”
Adverse Possession, 100 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1037, 1059 (2006) (noting that
a purpose of adverse possession is to prod “the sleeping owner” or
reward “the productive possessor”); Claeys, supra note 42, at 53 (noting
that “demerit” asks whether the owner is disentitled because his moral
interest expires, or because others divest his continuing claim).

50.

See Claeys, supra note 42, at 53 (suggesting that Locke’s property
theory is best described as a theory of property rights secured through
productive labor). Admittedly, this productive use can be met in part
by delineating boundaries in a way that discloses their existence to
others who might be interested in the property. See Rose, Possession,
supra note 17, at 88.

51.

Thomas Merrill, for example, criticizes what he sees as the four major
permutations of the reliance-based merit rationale—preserving the
peace, honoring the adverse possessor’s personal attachment to property
as part of her identity, a sunk-cost or quasi-rents rationale grounded in
forestalling ambush and holdout by the record owner, and reliance of
the public on the adverse possessor’s apparent ownership—because none
of them actually justify transferring the property to the adverse
possessor. Thomas W. Merrill, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Adverse Possession, 79 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1122, 1131–32 (1985).

52.

Ballantine, supra note 48, at 135.

53.

See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Abandon, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev.
355, 415–19 (2010) (arguing that it is nearly impossible to reason why
bad-faith adverse possession should be permitted while abandonment of
real property is prohibited).
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Where the demerit of the record owner was significant, the property
would fall back to the public domain to be claimed again via auction,
capture, or some other possessory act. An auction of this sort can be
wasteful, however, as potential claimants hoping to win the race will
be willing to expend resources up to their best estimation of the value
of the property, resulting in a total expenditure of resources greater
than the value of the property in the hands of any potential victorious
claimant. 54 Adverse possession avoids the inefficient race to claim the
abandoned property by weighing the record owner’s demerit against
the possessor’s merit and making the transfer only where the relative
weight justifies the shift.
The requirements that possession be actual, open, and continuous
are arguably grounded in the desire to provide the record owner with
sufficient notice of the threat to her property right. Thus, only the
truly disinterested or inattentive property owner loses title, which
helps the public discern which record owners might “demerit”—or
deserve to lose—the property. 55 The merit rationale has been seen
alternately as grounded in the psychological attachment of the
adverse possessor to the property, 56 or in the labor performed in
54.

See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of
Trademark Law, 78 Trademark Rep. 267, 280 (1988) (arguing that a
use-driven first possession regime minimizes rent-seeking, and comparing
the U.S. system favorably to the Japanese system, where the pure
registration system permits the “banking” of trademarks); see also
Joseph P. Liu, Legitimacy and Authority in Internet Coordination: A
Domain Name Case Study, 74 Ind. L.J. 587, 607 (1999) (describing the
domain name allocation system as an inefficient “pure registration
system” that “gives rise to wasteful ‘rent seeking’ and ‘gold rushes,’ as
parties compete to lock up potentially valuable domain names, without
any thought of productive use”). This Article contrasts the trademark
and domain-name regimes in more detail in Part IV.C.

55.

Of course, even unproductive squatting could provide notice to the
owner that someone hoped to obtain possession over the land. Larissa
Katz notes, however, that under the inconsistent use test applied in
Canadian law, only the possessor who puts the property to different use
than the owner can secure through adverse possession. Larissa Katz,
The Moral Paradox of Adverse Possession: Sovereignty and Revolution
in Property Law, 55 McGill L.J. 47, 65 (2010).

56.

See Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a
Property Paradigm, 54 Duke L.J. 1, 54 n.224 (2004) (“Adverse
possession, for example, reflects not only a utilitarian conception of
robust land development but also personhood and labor theories: an
adverse possessor identifies more directly with the land than does its
absentee owner (personhood) and has a Lockean claim based on
development of the land (labor).”); O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law,
10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 477 (1897) (“A thing which you have enjoyed
and used as your own for a long time . . . takes root in your being and
cannot be torn away without your resenting the act and trying to
defend yourself, however you came by it.”).
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exercising exclusive control over the property, 57 but neither version of
the attachment or labor the rationale fully realize the social value
provided by the adverse possessor.
While the adverse possession factors are traditionally understood
to inquire whether the adverse possessor provides a sufficiently clear
signal about her claim to the inattentive record owner, successful
adverse possession also provides an important signal to the public.
Carol Rose argues that possession is communicative, a “statement”
providing “notice to the world through a clear act.” 58 Thus, some of
the value of adverse possession stems from its ability to communicate
a claim of right to the public. Proper or “suitable” use—the type of
use typical of an owner—provides notice to the public that the user
wishes to interact with society as an owner. 59 Rose posits that the
transfer of property is justified on notice grounds when the record
owner fails to eject or locate the adverse possessor. The record owner
“fails to correct misleading appearances” while the adverse possessor
“speaks loudly and clearly.” 60 The information-forcing role played by
the adverse possessor can lower transaction costs because it allows the
public to “rely upon their own reasonable perceptions.” 61
Eduardo Peñalver and Sonia Katyal suggest that adverse
possession is justified precisely because the adverse possessor’s
willingness to possess the property, in the face of possible dispossession
57.

See John Locke, Two Treatises of Government 305–09 (Peter
Laslett ed., 2d ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1967) (1690) (explaining that
one’s labor undertaken to annex and exclude others from the common
state of nature and the appropriation one makes to himself results in a
claim to property); Carrier, supra note 56, at 54 n.224 (noting that
adverse possession reflects notions of land development and labor
theories); Claeys, supra note 42, at 53 (noting that productive labor
theory conditions property ownership on a responsibility to make use of
the land).

58.

Rose, Possession, supra note 17, at 77.

59.

Id. at 78.

60.

Id. at 80.

61.

Id.; see also id. at 79 (“[Adverse possession] might be designed . . . to
require the owner to assert her right publicly. It requires her to make it
clear that she, and not the trespasser, is the person to deal with if
anyone should wish to buy the property or use some portion of it.”).
Thus, while the use required of an adverse possessor is merely use
consistent with the character of the property and its location,
Strahilevitz, supra note 53, at 417, the use is important because of its
relative value, compared to the use of the record owner. Likewise, Rose
reads the famous fox capture case, Pierson v. Post, as an instance where
possession itself is a communicative “clear act.” Rose, Possession, supra
note 17, at 77 (citing Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805)).
Rose sees in Pierson a merger of Lockean labor and Blackstonian first
entry. The capturing owner both adds value to or mixes labor with the
captured property and signals to the public its claim to the property. Id.
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before the end of the statutory period—as well as criminal and civil
sanctions for trespass—signals that she highly values the property.62
On the other hand, the record owner’s failure to take action against
the adverse possessor within the statutory period signals the low value
she places on the property. 63
Thus, adverse possession signals the comparative value that
record owner and adverse possessor place on the property. Because
the record owner has some trappings of notice, the record owner
retains title merely by policing her boundaries and challenging
encroachers. This is sufficient to send a clear signal of the property’s
value. The adverse possessor must do more, engaging in some level of
perceptible productive use not required by a record owner. This use
signals to the public not only that the adverse possessor values the
property, but that society should value the use to which the adverse
possessor puts the property, or in the alternative, value the adverse
possessor as a transaction party with regard to said property.
The productive use requirement in trademark law serves similar
functions, and stems from similar policy concerns. Consistent with the
common law origins of trademark protection, trademark rights can be
secured without any registration whatsoever and enforced as a matter
of federal law. 64 The productive use of the trademark in commerce
defines the scope of the mark owner’s property right and provides a
notice function similar to that provided by open and notorious use
requirement in adverse possession. 65 As Judge Easterbrook noted in
62.

Peñalver & Katyal, supra note 45, at 128–29 (citing Fennell, supra
note 49, at 1040); see also Claeys, supra note 42, at 54 (noting that in
the adverse possession context, under the Lockean labor theory, “[t]he
encroacher’s long occupancy is a simple and reliable proxy for her future
productive use—just as a first-possessor’s occupancy is in relation to
[previously] unowned land”).

63.

Peñalver & Katyal, supra note 45, at 129. Peñalver & Katyal go on
to argue that the law should also allow a high-value possessor to secure
property where there is evidence of that high valuation and an absence
of evidence about the owner’s valuation. Id. Claeys concurs from a
Lockean perspective, noting that the silence of the record owner
“provides objective proof that his interest in the land is not really that
strong.” Claeys, supra note 42, at 55.

64.

See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006) (setting forth a right of civil action for
false designations of origin and false or misleading representations and
descriptions).

65.

See Zazú Designs v. L’Oréal, S.A., 979 F.2d 499, 503 (7th Cir. 1992)
(noting that nationwide rights to a trademark are based on market
saturation capable of putting other producers on notice of the mark’s
use); see also Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 18
cmt. a (1995) (“Actual use by the claimant also furnishes public notice
of the user’s potential rights in the designation.”); Graeme B. Dinwoodie
& Mark D. Janis, Confusion Over Use: Contextualism in Trademark
Law, 92 Iowa L. Rev. 1597, 1612 n.63 (2007) [hereinafter Dinwoodie &
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the case of Zazú Designs v. L’Oréal, S.A., “Only active use allows
consumers to associate a mark with particular goods and notifies
other firms that the mark is so associated.” 66 The obligation to use
the mark in commerce is, in part, a requirement that the trademark
owner’s attempted possession occur with sufficient visibility to put
both potential competitors and the public on notice. Goods need not
be offered for sale initially, so long as analogous use, like pre-sales
publicity, is open and notorious, 67 that is, sufficient to “popularize
[the mark] in the public mind,” 68 and followed by bona fide use.69
Thus, a mark owner’s property right is recognized only when she can
establish use sufficient to secure secondary meaning or commercial
strength. Without such a showing, she cannot enforce her rights
against an alleged infringing user.
The dominant justification for trademark rights has been an
economic rationale: trademark protection is arguably designed to
reduce consumer search costs and provide an incentive to the mark
owner to provide goods and services of consistent quality, by allowing
the mark owner to protect the mark as a unique signifier of that
quality. 70 In addition to lowering search costs, trademark protection
serves a correlative function of protecting the public from deceit or
fraud by providing a remedy against confusing misappropriation of
trademarks. 71 Mark owners are incentivized to maintain a consistent
Janis, Contextualism] (noting that the use requirement serves a public
notice function); Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Use, Intent to
Use and Registration in the USA, in Trade Mark Use 313, 315
(Jeremy Phillips & Ilanah Simon eds., 2005) (noting that the use
requirement serves as a mechanism to put the public on notice).
66.

L’Oréal, 979 F.2d at 503.

67.

Sterling Drug Inc. v. Knoll A.-G. Chemische Fabriken, 159 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 628, 631 (T.T.A.B. 1968) (“To acquire trademark rights there
has to be an ‘open’ use, that is to say, a use has to be made to the
relevant class of purchasers or prospective purchasers . . . .”).

68.

Am. Express Co. v. Goetz, 515 F.3d 156, 162 (2d Cir. 2008) (per
curiam) (quoting Hous. & Servs., Inc. v. Minton, No. 97 Civ.
2725(SHS), 1997 WL 349949, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 24, 1997)).

69.

See SODIMA v. Int’l Yogurt Co., Inc., 662 F. Supp. 839, 853 (D. Or.
1987) (“[P]riority need not depend solely on who gets to the consumer
first, as long as there is bona fide shipment or activity . . . .”).

70.

Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L.
Rev. 621, 623–24 (2004). But see Mark P. McKenna, A Consumer
Decision-Making Theory of Trademark Law, 98 Va. L. Rev. 67, 72
(2012) (arguing that the search costs theory “distorts trademark law
because neither confusion nor search costs are the right focus”).

71.

See Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection,
40 Harv. L. Rev. 813, 819 (1927) (arguing that trademark protection
“originated as a police measure to prevent ‘the grievous deceit of the
people’ ”).
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quality of goods in part because they can rely on trademark law to
help remedy some attempts to free ride on the goodwill that stems
from providing desirable goods of a constant quality. 72 As a byproduct, trademark protection also protects producer investment in
developing source signification in the mark. 73
There are other rationales for trademark protection and each one
manifests some recognition of the importance of productive use as a
justification for trademark rights or the importance of notice in the
trademark system. The unfair competition rationale, for example, has
been described as embracing two complementary functions: protecting
business goodwill and protecting consumer recognition. 74 The development of business goodwill happens through the mark owner’s
productive use, and this use puts the public on notice of the goods or
services offered by the owner under that mark.
Other rationales, like the unjust enrichment or anti-free-riding
rationale, 75 and the Lockean labor rationale, 76 have been criticized
because they are too property-like and reward the labor of mark
creation instead of mark use. 77 In addition, the unjust-enrichment
72.

See Union Nat’l Bank of Tex., Laredo v. Union Nat’l Bank of Tex.,
Austin, 909 F.2d 839, 844 (5th Cir. 1990) (“[T]rademarks . . . encourage
higher quality production by discouraging free-riders.”). It may be more
correct to say that trademarks encourage consistency in quality. One is,
for example, less interested in improvement at the local McDonald’s
than the fungibility of the McDonald’s experience.

73.

See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163–64 (1995)
(upholding registration of a trademark consisting only of a color); Eric
Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy in Internet Trademark Law, 54 Emory
L.J. 507, 552 (2005) (proposing that one purpose of trademark law is to
protect “producers’ investment in quality that creates consumer goodwill
towards them”).

74.

See Adam Mossoff, What Is Property? Putting the Pieces Back
Together, 45 Ariz. L. Rev. 371, 422 (2003) (describing the shift in
trademark law from an integrated property theory to a bundle or
exclusion theory, which “served the social goals of unfair competition
law”).

75.

See Robert G. Bone, Enforcement Costs and Trademark Puzzles, 90 Va.
L. Rev. 2099, 2111 (2004) (“ ‘[U]njust enrichment,’ focuses on sellers
rather than consumers. It supposes that a seller is unjustly enriched when
it appropriates to its own advantage the ‘goodwill’ that another seller has
developed in its mark.” (footnote omitted)).

76.

See Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property
and the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 Va. L. Rev. 149, 167 n.64 (1992)
(“In my view, ‘Lockean theory’ is largely the label courts use for their
conviction that it is unfair for one person to take the fruits of another’s
labor. . . . [But] Locke’s own approach, properly understood, leads to far
fewer intellectual property rights than has been imagined.”).

77.

See Keith Aoki, Authors, Inventors and Trademark Owners: Private
Intellectual Property and the Public Domain (pt. 2), 18 Colum.-VLA
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rationale has been challenged on the ground that it mistakenly
maximizes the interest of the mark owner instead of the interests of
the purchasing public, and this comes at the expense of competition.78
Nevertheless, underlying both the unjust enrichment and Lockean
rationales is the notion that the mark is protected because, by using
the mark in commerce, the mark owner has engaged in the production
of meaning, valuable to the public and competitors. To the extent
that those doctrines are used to justify problematic shifts in
trademark law, the error is not in rewarding productive use but in
granting trademark rights without requiring productive use, or
providing levels of protection that are too broad.
Consumer-focused rationales, like consumer protection 79 and
consumer autonomy, 80 are more engaged with the notice side of the
productive use equation. Marks are protected both because the
protection keeps unscrupulous competitors from duping consumers, 81
and because it preserves the ability of consumers to differentiate
between competitors’ goods and services. 82 Protection of trademark
J.L. & Arts 191, 240–41 (1994) (describing the opposing arguments for
compensating mark creation for the surplus value placed on the mark in
excess of the attached good in commerce).
78.

Jennifer E. Rothman, Initial Interest Confusion: Standing at the
Crossroads of Trademark Law, 27 Cardozo L. Rev. 105, 163 (2005)
(arguing that the unjust enrichment rationale must be limited in the
trademark context by “traditional notions of fair competition”).

79.

See Bone, supra note 75, at 2108 (“The clearest moral principle relevant
to trademark law is the moral norm against intentional deception or
lying.”). Nevertheless, there is some overlap between protecting the
intangible value associated with the mark and “protecting the buying
public from some of the more unscrupulous members of our economic
community.” Maier Brewing Co. v. Fleischmann Distilling Corp., 390
F.2d 117, 123 (9th Cir. 1968).

80.

See Dinwoodie & Janis, Contextualism, supra note 65, at 1625 (2007)
(arguing that “preserving real consumer choice and enhancing consumer
autonomy” is an instrumental role for trademark protection that reaches
beyond economic efficiency rationales). Robert Bone, however, critiques
the consumer autonomy rationale as “not only impossible to satisfy but
also . . . in hopeless conflict with other rights.” Bone, supra note 75, at
2110 n.31. See also McKenna, supra note 70 (arguing for a greater focus
on consumer decision making in trademark law over the search costs
theory currently accepted by courts).

81.

See Mossoff, supra note 74, at 419 (“[T]he fundamental principles of
trademark law have essentially been ones of tort: the tort of
misappropriation of the goodwill of the trademark owner, and the tort of
deception of the consumer. In this sense, trademarks may not be
thought of as analogous to ‘property rights’ at all.” (quoting Robert P.
Merges et al., Intellectual Property in the New
Technological Age 559 (2d ed. 2000))).

82.

See 4 McCarthy, supra note 29, § 24:16 (“The consumer is entitled to
be told the truth about the origin or sponsorship of products. . . . If the
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rights can serve these consumer-focused functions even though marks
do not convey perfect information. It must be noted, however, that
consumers contribute to the creation of the property right as they
come to use the mark as an indication of the mark owner’s goods and
services. 83 Some public uses can also pose a threat to those rights.
Both dynamics are discussed in more detail in Part III.
C.

The Notice Functions of Fencing, Color of Title,
and Trademark Registration

For the aspiring property owner, even relatively limited
productive use can secure property rights, when accompanying other
notice-providing indicia. For example, fencing a parcel of property is
usually treated as actual possession of the entire fenced portion, 84
sufficiently open and notorious to put the public and the record owner
on notice of the claim, even if productive activity takes place only on
a part of the parcel. 85 Likewise, taking the property under color of title
is usually sufficient to establish use of the entire parcel designated in
the faulty title, so long as the adverse possessor actually uses part of
the property. 86 In some jurisdictions, the statutory period of exclusive
possession required to secure title by adverse possession is shorter
when the possession occurs under color of title. 87 In other
consumer is reasonably mistaken as to the source or sponsorship of an
alleged infringer’s goods, she suffers a real and independent injury to her
rights regardless of whether or not she is economically injured by the
poor quality of the infringer’s goods or services.”).
83.

See Deborah R. Gerhardt, Consumer Investment in Trademarks, 88
N.C. L. Rev. 427, 449–67 (2010) (noting the important role consumers
play in determining which brands succeed in a world where eight out of
ten brands fail); Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman: The Public
Interest in the Advertising Age, 108 Yale L.J. 1717, 1730 (1999)
(arguing that consumers impart trade symbols with intrinsic value).

84.

See Whittemore v. Amator, 713 P.2d 1231, 1233 (Ariz. 1986) (en
banc) (maintaining a fence was sufficient to establish dominion over
an entire parcel of land despite only actually using a smaller portion
for livestock grazing).

85.

See, e.g., Smith v. Tippett, 569 A.2d 1186 (D.C. 1990) (encircling the
property within a wall was sufficiently open and notorious).

86.

See DeShon v. St. Joseph Country Club, 755 S.W.2d 265, 268 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1988) (“Color of title . . . serves to extend actual possession of
some portion of the land claimed to constructive possession of the whole
tract described in the instrument providing basis for color of title.”); see
also Pillow v. Roberts, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 472, 477 (1851) (“[C]olor of
title, even under a void and worthless deed, has always been received as
evidence that the person in possession claims for himself, and of course,
adversely to all the world.”).

87.

See, e.g., Wis. Stat. §§ 893.25–.27 (2012) (requiring twenty years if
adverse possessor actually occupied property under claim of right and
either enclosed or improved it, ten years if adverse possessor recorded
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jurisdictions, the adverse possession statute expressly excludes a
transfer of property unless the possession occurs under color of title.88
When an encroacher seeks to adversely possess real property,
indications of notice like fencing or possessing under color of title will
broaden the reach of the productive use. Thus, use of any portion of a
fenced parcel amounts to constructive possession of the entire parcel.89
Without actual possession, however, holding a flawed document that
provides the color of title cannot by itself convey title to the property.
For the trademark owner, registration also resembles color of title:
registration alone secures no rights. 90 Federal registration provides a
mechanism to assert rights in a trademark, but provides only prima
facie evidence that the registrant has used the mark in commerce. 91
While a trademark owner can file an application based on a bona fide
intent to use a trademark in commerce, and that “ITU” application
can give priority over a subsequent user, the applicant’s rights do not
vest until the mark is actually used in commerce. 92 Every registrant
also has an obligation to provide continuing evidence of use, or the
registration will be cancelled. 93 Thus, like possessing property under

color of title, and seven years if adverse possessor recorded color of title
and paid taxes).
88.

See, e.g., Act 776, 1995 Ark. Acts 3370 (establishing additional requirements for adverse possession).

89.

Whittemore, 713 P.2d at 1233.

90.

Am. Express Co. v. Goetz 515 F.3d 156, 161 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[T]here
can be no trademark absent goods sold and no service mark without
services rendered.”).

91.

Zazú Designs v. L’Oréal, S.A., 979 F.2d 499, 503 (7th Cir. 1992). The
court in L’Oréal goes on to suggest that “[l]iberality in registering marks
is not problematic, because the registration gives notice to latecomers,
which token use alone does not. Firms need only search the register
before embarking on development.” Id. at 504.

92.

See WarnerVision Entm’t Inc. v. Empire of Carolina, Inc., 101 F.3d 259,
260 (2d Cir. 1996) (noting that registration may be granted only after
an ITU applicant files a statement of commercial use); Zirco Corp. v.
Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1542, 1544 (T.T.A.B. 1991)
(“[T]he constructive use provision was intended . . . to give an intent-touse applicant a superior right over anyone adopting a mark after
applicant’s filing date (providing the applicant’s mark is ultimately used
and registered) . . . .”).

93.

See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1058–1059 (2006) (establishing the requirements and
duration of registration and the process for renewal); Torres v. Cantine
Torresella S.r.l., 808 F.2d 46, 49 (Fed Cir. 1986) (affirming cancellation
of a mark where the application for renewal fraudulently stated the
mark was used on wine, vermouth, and champagne, when, in reality, a
modified mark was used only on wine).
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color of title, those rights conferred through trademark registration
are contingent on actual use. 94
In both regimes, productive use defines the scope of the right, but
plus factors—like color of title or fencing in the adverse possession
context, or registration in the trademark context—can alleviate some
of the demands of productive use. 95 This is sensible because in both
cases, those plus factors increase notice to the public of the claim to
the property at issue. The faulty title, the fence, and the registration
all provide objective evidence of the scope of the claim to the public,
especially to potential competitors. Thus, it is reasonable to provide
some benefits to the owner of a trademark registration, or the possessor
who holds color of title, so long as those benefits do not strip the
trademark system of the productive use requirement entirely. 96
D.

Continuous Use and Acquiring Distinctiveness

In addition to actual, open, and notorious use, both the adverse
possessor and the trademark owner must engage in continuing
productive use to secure rights. The adverse possessor must be in
continuous possession for the statutory period, but “continuous” here
is a term of art. Continuous adverse possession need not be literally
continuous, but must be effectively continuous. For example, the
continuous use requirement can be met through seasonal use, if that is
reasonable for the location. 97 In addition, use by a seller who
attempts to convey title to a buyer “tacks,” or is counted for the
benefit of the buyer, in meeting the statutorily required period of
exclusive possession. 98
In its temporal aspect, acquiring trademark rights in a descriptive
term closely resembles acquiring title to real property via adverse
94.

See 3 McCarthy, supra note 29, § 19:1.75 (“[R]egistration in the U.S.
does not create the trademark, the owner creates the underlying right
though [sic] use in the marketplace.”).

95.

See Landes & Posner, supra note 54, at 281 (“The main social benefit of
a federal registration system is that notice is likely to be more
widespread, so that inadvertent duplication is less likely; hence, use
becomes a less important method of preventing duplication.”).

96.

But see Kenneth L. Port, The Congressional Expansion of American
Trademark Law: A Civil Law System in the Making, 35 Wake Forest
L. Rev. 827, 865–66 (2000) (arguing that the actual-use backstop fails
to keep the intent-to-use registration system from granting rights based
solely on registration).

97.

See, e.g., Howard v. Kunto, 477 P.2d 210, 213–14 (Wash. Ct. App.
1970) (finding that summer use of a summer home every year amounts
to continuous use).

98.

See Stump v. Whibco, 715 A.2d 1006, 1011 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1998) (noting that tacking is a “well established” principle and applies
as long as the seller intended to convey the disputed parcel).
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possession. A descriptive term is not protected upon its first use in
commerce as a trademark because it does not initially communicate
information about the source of the goods. Instead, the mark must
acquire distinctiveness or secondary meaning: consumers must come
to recognize that the mark signifies a consistent source for the goods
or services. 99 Likewise, the Lanham Act bars the registration of a
descriptive term until there is sufficient evidence that the term has
acquired distinctiveness. 100
Pursuant to section 2(f) of the Lanham Act, examiners with the
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) have the
option of treating five years of substantially exclusive and continuous
use of a descriptive mark as prima facie evidence of secondary
meaning and granting a registration based on such an affidavit.101
This section 2(f) presumption is reminiscent of the adverse possession
regime because in both cases, exclusive possession over time
establishes the property right. Note, however, that while the USPTO
can treat every descriptive mark as registrable after five years of
exclusive use, different types of trademarks actually receive different
treatment. For example, five years’ use is generally enough for a mark
based on a surname to acquire secondary meaning. 102 On the other
hand, the statement of five years’ use alone is insufficient to establish
secondary meaning for trade dress that “is not inherently distinctive
because of its nature.” 103 This is consistent with the notice
justification driving the trademark use requirement. The USPTO
demonstrates an inclination to see a longer period of use before
granting a registration to marks that are less inherently capable of
providing notice to the public.
Any registration, including one for a descriptive mark that has
acquired distinctiveness, can also become “incontestable” after five
consecutive years of continuous use, so long as the mark is still in use,
and so long as neither the registration nor the common law rights in
the mark have been challenged. 104 The five-year window to acquire an
incontestable registration resembles the adverse possession regime in
its own right, with elements of notice (via the registration system)
and at least an inferred requirement that the mark is used under
99.

See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 769 (1992)
(stating as a general rule that marks may be protected if they are
inherently distinctive or have “acquired distinctiveness through
secondary meaning”).

100. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)–(f) (2006).
101. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f).
102. TMEP § 1212.05(a) (8th ed. Rev. Oct. 2012).
103. Id.
104. 15 U.S.C. § 1065.
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claim of right and exclusively, in addition to the requirement of
continuous use. In some jurisdictions, the existence of an incontestable
registration is evidence of at least some level of commercial strength,
even if the mark is merely descriptive. 105
Courts also frequently evaluate length of use in determining
whether secondary meaning has been acquired, 106 but there is no
established time for how long a mark must be used in commerce before
it acquires secondary meaning. 107 Courts have repeatedly opined that
there is no per se minimum amount of time required to establish
secondary meaning, 108 but also no maximum beyond which secondary
meaning will automatically accrue. 109 Even though courts disclaim any
precise amount of time as necessary or sufficient to acquire commercial
strength, length of use is a factor always considered, and in some cases,
dispositive. For example, in Marilyn Miglin Model Makeup, Inc. v.
Jovan, Inc., the court concluded the paucity in length of use—less than
four years—was brief enough that yearly sales of over $3 million and an
advertising budget averaging more than $500,000 per year was
insufficient to establish secondary meaning. 110
The similarity between the acquisition of property through
adverse possession and the acquisition of trademark rights in a
descriptive term is therefore fairly apparent. The tale typically told is
that the descriptive term may pull itself up by its bootstraps, acquire
distinctiveness, and become a trademark. On the other hand,
inherently distinctive marks are treated as strong and protectable

105. Such a presumption runs the danger of reading the productive use
requirement out of trademark law entirely and should be resisted. See
infra Part V.A.
106. See, e.g., Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 380
(7th Cir. 1976).
107. 2 McCarthy, supra note 29, § 15:54.
108. See, e.g., L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1130
(Fed. Cir. 1993) (rejecting the argument that five months was
insufficient time to acquire secondary meaning).
109. See, e.g., ERBE Elektromedizin GmbH v. Canady Tech., LLC, 629 F.3d
1278 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (affirming summary judgment ruling that trade
dress was not protectable despite thirty years of use of color blue on
medical instruments). The difference in the temporal certainty offered
the adverse possessor and the temporal uncertainty facing the
trademark owner is discussed in more detail in Part IV.D.
110. Miglin Model Makeup, Inc. v. Jovan, Inc., 224 U.S.P.Q. 178, 180–81
(N.D. Ill. 1984). The court stated that the amounts were $25.5 million
in sales and $4.5 million in advertising budget for Miglin over the nine
years between 1976 and 1984. Those amounts come out to more than $3
million and exactly $500,000 in per year totals.

725

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 3 ·2013
Trademark Owner as Adverse Possessor

perpetually and without question from first use. 111 This does not line
up with the traditional account of property acquisition through adverse
possession. That apparent conundrum is addressed in Part II.A.

II. Productive Use and Trademark Scope
While Part I described the closest analogies between adverse
possession and trademark acquisition, this Part considers some
apparent differences in the regimes and reveals the hidden
consistencies when those differences are considered through the lens of
the productive use requirement. Part II.A addresses in detail the
apparent dissonance between adverse possession and the acquisition of
rights in inherently distinctive marks. The distance between the
regimes is lessened when one realizes that the evidence required to
produce secondary meaning in a descriptive term is the same evidence
presented to establish the commercial strength, and thus the
enforceability, of an inherently distinctive mark. Part II.B addresses
the “hostility” misnomer that has crept into adverse possession
doctrine. The productive use framework clarifies how claiming rights
in both regimes focuses on providing the public with notice of the
respective claims. Part II.C discusses the surface tension between
adverse possession’s exclusivity requirement and the exclusivity requirement in trademark law and shows how the comparison clarifies
the nature of the property secured by the trademark owner.
A.

Productive Use and Inherently Distinctive Marks

As discussed in Part I.D, acquiring rights in a descriptive mark
resembles adverse possession in its temporal aspect. At first glance,
the protection for inherently distinctive marks seems, in comparison,
to barely resemble adverse possession. Unlike a descriptive term, an
inherently distinctive mark is treated as source signifying on its first
use in commerce, so long as that first use is followed by “continuous
commercial utilization.” 112 That first use grants priority against other
users of the same or similar marks for the same or similar services. 113
Inherently distinctive marks are treated as possessing secondary
meaning at the moment of their first use in commerce because there
was no other descriptive primary meaning related to the goods or
111. See Nutri/System, Inc. v. Con-Stan Indus., Inc., 809 F.2d 601, 605 (9th
Cir. 1987) (“Arbitrary or fanciful marks (i.e., Kodak) are called ‘strong’
marks, whereas descriptive or suggestive marks are ‘weak.’ ”). But see 2
McCarthy, supra note 29 at § 11:83 (considering only inherent or
conceptual strength is “incomplete”).
112. Blue Bell, Inc. v. Farah Mfg. Co., 508 F.2d 1260, 1265 (5th Cir. 1975)
(“[E]ven a single use in trade may sustain trademark rights if followed
by continuous commercial utilization.”).
113. Id.
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services at issue. A fanciful or coined mark, like XEROX for
photocopying machines, is invented whole cloth and has no meaning
prior to its use as a trademark. An arbitrary mark, like APPLE for
computers, creates new meaning for a term with which we are
familiar. While a suggestive mark, like GLEEM for toothpaste, is
more closely related to the underlying goods or services than other
inherently distinctive marks, it still requires a conceptual leap to get
from the suggestive term to the product’s features. All of these marks
transform language and create new meaning in their inception and
use, and are thus inherently communicative. There is also no
requirement to show any particular duration of use in commerce
before registering an inherently distinctive mark, so long as the mark
has been used in commerce. 114 Thus, for inherently distinctive marks,
it appears that protection is automatic, and adverse possession might
be a poor analogy.
As this Subpart highlights, however, the use in commerce necessary
to acquire secondary meaning in a descriptive term is effectively the
same use necessary to establish the commercial strength of an
inherently distinctive mark. Without sufficient commercial strength,
developed over time, the right to exclusive use of the inherently
distinctive mark is largely illusory. In both cases, productive use over
time is the signal that informs the public about how much value the
mark owner places in the mark. That productive use over time also
reduces search costs for consumers by identifying a consistent source for
mark-bearing goods and services.
Barton Beebe’s comprehensive study of likelihood of confusion
cases in the federal district courts over a five-year period calls into
question the traditional story about automatic protection of
inherently strong marks. 115 Beebe’s study shows when the assessment
of the mark’s inherent strength is at odds with the mark’s acquired
strength, the finding of acquired strength trumps inherent strength. 116
114. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(1) (2006) (stating that a trademark owner
only need file and pay a fee to the Patent and Trademark Office to
register a trademark used in commerce), and § 1052(f) (stating that
nothing shall prevent an owner from registering a distinctive trademark
used in commerce, unless expressly excluded in other subsections of the
statute), with § 1052(f) (stating that proof of five years of substantially
exclusive and continuous use may be accepted as prima facie evidence
that a descriptive term has acquired distinctiveness).
115. Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for
Trademark Infringement, 94 Cal. L. Rev. 1581 (2006) [hereinafter,
Beebe, Multifactor Tests].
116. Id. at 1636. Beebe identified 27 cases where the owner of an inherently
strong mark had not established commercial strength. In 24 of those
cases (89%), the mark owner failed to establish that the allegedly
infringing use would likely confuse consumers. Id. A follow up study
confirmed this finding over fifteen years of cases from the Second Circuit
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In other words, it is the use of the mark in commerce and the notice
function served by that use, rather than its inherent conceptual
distinctiveness, that matters most.
A descriptive term must acquire significance in the marketplace as
a designation for goods and services, becoming protectable and
registrable through use in commerce. When trying to determine
whether a descriptive mark has acquired secondary meaning (or an
inherently distinctive mark has amassed commercial strength), courts
look to two overarching questions. First, do consumers see the mark
as source signifying, measured through consumer surveys and evidence
of actual consumer confusion? 117 Judges tend to distrust the validity
of survey evidence, 118 and evidence of actual consumer confusion can
be hard to come by. 119 So courts turn to a second question: Has the
mark owner done enough to establish the mark in the minds of
consumers through advertising, sales volume, and length of use?
Courts tend to give great weight to the efforts made by the mark
owner to move the mark through commerce, including money spent
on advertising, volume of product moved and sales of goods or
services. Time in the market also provides prima facie evidence that a
descriptive mark has acquired secondary meaning (which the USPTO
can choose to recognize in the registration context). 120 In the ex post
genericness context, efforts to educate consumers, lexicographers, and
other language shapers regarding proper use of its marks are also
important. 121 These factors all serve as proxy evidence that the
and its district courts. Kevin Blum et al., Consistency of Confusion? A
Fifteen-Year Revisiting of Barton Beebe’s Empirical Analysis of Multifactor
Tests for Trademark Infringement, Stan. Tech. L. Rev., ¶¶ 44–45 (2010),
http://stlr.stanford.edu/pdf/blum-consistency-of-confusion.pdf.
117. See Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 380 (7th
Cir. 1976) (stating that secondary meaning is established “if the public
is aware that the product comes from a single, though anonymous,
source”).
118. See, e.g., Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metro. Balt. Football Club, 34 F.3d
410, 415 (7th Cir. 1994) (Posner, J.) (suggesting that the “battle of
experts” in trademark disputes “is frequently unedifying” in part
because “[m]any experts are willing for a generous (and sometimes for a
modest) fee to bend their science in the direction from which their fee is
coming”); 6 McCarthy, supra note 29, § 32:196 (suggesting that some
judicial skepticism may stem from the behavior of “parties and their
attorneys who, in a desperate search for some kind of evidence, offer,
with a straight face, a haphazard, self-serving ‘survey’ ”).
119. See Nabisco Brands, Inc. v. Kaye, 760 F. Supp. 25, 28 (D. Conn. 1991)
(“[I]t is unnecessary for plaintiff to show evidence of actual confusion
[because] such evidence is exceedingly rare.”).
120. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (2006).
121. See also infra note 146 and accompanying text.
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consuming public has taken notice of and imbued the mark with
source significance.
These are effectively the same factors that courts consider when
trying to determine whether a mark (whether its source significance is
inherent or acquired) has developed the commercial strength that
would suggest use by competitors to sell similar goods under similar
marks should lead to a finding that confusion was likely. 122 For
example, in the Second Circuit, courts consider consumer testimony;
consumer surveys; the exclusivity, length, and manner of the mark
owner’s use; the amount and manner of advertising; the amount of
sales and number of consumers; the mark’s established place in the
market measured through unsolicited media coverage; and proof of
intentional copying. 123 Thus, the strength of a mark—the property
right secured—is a matter both of inherent strength (or lack thereof)
and commercial strength, or developed strength in the marketplace.
As Beebe’s study reports, a conclusion by the court that the mark is
commercially weak, even if inherently strong, appears virtually fatal
to a claim of trademark infringement. 124
Beebe concludes from this evidence that district courts recognize
that “acquired or ‘actual strength’ in the marketplace logically
incorporates the effects of the mark’s inherent strength.” 125 It may be
equally likely that courts recognize that successful use in commerce,
rather than inherent strength, provides the strongest indicator of
trademark ownership. While many of the likelihood-of-confusion
factors key into the conflict between the parties (similarity of marks
and goods, proximity of services, likelihood that the plaintiff will
bridge the gap) and the perception of consumers (evidence of actual
confusion), strength of the mark is really about the extent to which
the trademark owner has claimed the right to use the trademark,
shown by the breadth and length of her use of the mark in commerce.
It is probably correct to say that marks starting from a position
of inherent strength are more readily able to acquire strength in the
market, perhaps because consumers more easily recognize inherently
122. See 2 McCarthy, supra note 29, § 11:82 (“[D]etermination of whether
there is infringement requires an evaluation of the strength of [a]
trademark.”).
123. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 973 F.2d 1033, 1041
(2d Cir. 1992); see also Mark P. McKenna, Teaching Trademark Theory
through the Lens of Distinctiveness, 52 St. Louis U. L.J. 843, 846–47
(2008) (“[T]rademark strength . . . is one of the factors that determines
the scope of a party’s rights.”).
124. See Beebe, Multifactor Tests, supra note 115, at 1636 (showing that
plaintiff prevailed only 4 times in 74 cases (5%) where the court found
the mark commercially weak).
125. Id.
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distinctive marks as source signifying. 126 But the district court
decisions analyzed in Beebe’s study lean more heavily on the paucity
of commercial strength than the presence of inherent strength when
determining whether the mark in question is strong and whether there
is a likelihood of confusion. For example, in We Media Inc. v. General
Electric Co., plaintiff’s marks WE and WEMEDIA for magazines and
newsletters promoting the disabled community were found to be
suggestive. 127 The court presumed the suggestive marks were strong,
but that presumptive strength was “reduced to reflect third-party
usage and [plaintiff’s] own lack of usage.” 128
Here, the subtle difference between trademark acquisition and
adverse possession helps us understand this account. In the trademark
context, there remains both an affirmative duty to provide affidavits
of continuing use and the risk that failure to use the mark in
commerce will abandon the mark to the public domain. 129 We might
therefore analogize inherent strength to plus factors like possession
under color of title and fencing in the adverse possession context. 130
The communicative nature of the inherently distinctive mark suggests
that consumers will quickly, if not automatically, recognize the mark
as source signifying, but the scope of the protection granted depends
more on the mark’s commercial strength developed over time.
B.

Claims of Right and the Hostility Misnomer

Scholars analyzing adverse possession have traditionally focused
on the subjective hostility or adversity of the occupier. 131 The
comparison to trademark law helps clarify that such hostility is a
misnomer. Courts should instead focus on the objective assertion of
ownership via notifying productive use. It is the use supporting that
assertion which provides sufficient notice to the public and other
potential claimants, regardless of the adverse possessor’s internal
hostility.
126. See Bone, supra note 75, at 2130–34 (arguing that there is a high
probability that an inherently distinctive mark will acquire secondary
meaning or commercial strength, while there is a lower probability that
descriptive terms will acquire secondary meaning).
127. We Media Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 218 F. Supp. 2d 463, 472 (S.D.N.Y.
2002).
128. Id. at 477; see also M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, L.L.C., 281 F.
Supp. 2d 1166, 1171 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (explaining that an arbitrary or
fanciful mark can be commercially weak).
129. See infra Part IV.D.
130. See supra Part I.C.
131. See generally Christopher H. Meredith, Note, Imputed Abandonment: A
Fresh Perspective on Adverse Possession and a Defense of the Objective
Standard, 29 Miss. C. L. Rev. 257, 261 (2010) (summarizing the
literature).
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As discussed in Part I.B, open and notorious occupation of
property notifies the public and the record owner of the occupier’s
claim to the property. Open and notorious use of the mark in
commerce puts the public and potential competitors on notice in the
same way. In both cases, the occupier is asserting a claim of right—
treating the property as her own, and holding the property without
the permission of a record owner. 132
In the adverse possession context, permitted use is not trespass and
cannot lead to an action by the record owner against the occupier for
ejectment. 133 This is so because a contrary rule would allow a permitted
occupant to sandbag the owner and spring an adverse possession claim
without providing fair notice to the owner of her intentions.
While scholars have argued at length about whether a claim of
right properly requires or rejects knowing or “bad faith” possession, 134
the controversy dissipates when one understands that adverse
possession keys on productive use that provides notice to the world of
the claim of the adverse possessor. As the Supreme Court noted as far
back as 1851, what is crucial is that the possessor “claims [the
property] for himself,” in other words, “adversely to all the world.”135
In its abstract and doctrinal sense, the issue of bad faith adverse
possession has not been resolved. These doctrinal variations and the
scholarship surrounding them nevertheless all point, perhaps
unknowingly, toward the same conclusion: either intentional or
unintentional possession of property belonging to another can be
considered possession under claim of right to the extent it puts the
public on notice of the adverse possessor’s claim. The critical element
is that to secure title in the property, the occupier must act like an
owner. Whether or not the possession is innocent or intentional, it is
consistent with the productive use rationale to incentivize possession
that sends a signal sufficiently strong to prevent ambush of the record
owner and provide notice to the public. It is the information forcing
value of the productive use that should be preserved. 136
132. See, e.g., Zimmerman v. Newport, 416 P.2d 622, 629 (Okla. 1966)
(“[C]laim to the property must be adverse and hostile to the title of the
true owner.”).
133. See, e.g., Murray v. Fuller, 186 P.2d 157, 160 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1947)
(holding that use of a driveway without express permission amounted to
trespassing).
134. For this Article’s proposed intervention regarding the debate, see infra
Part V.C.
135. Pillow v. Roberts, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 472, 477 (1851).
136. Mark Lemley argues that, while the right to exclude is an important
incentive for copyright and patent protection because it allows the
copyright or patent holder to recover the average total cost of
production, this incentive rationale “cannot justify intellectual property
rights in trademarks.” Lemley, Free Riding, supra note 2, at 1058.
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On the surface, the trademark owner does not look like an
“adverse” or “hostile” possessor because under the hostility misnomer,
it has become common to think of the adversity as a head-to-head
battle between an active user and a neglectful owner. The one who
puts a descriptive, suggestive, or arbitrary term to work as a
trademark is not seen to take that term from any other entity with a
preexisting right in the term. The disjunction is even more
pronounced where the mark owner coins a fanciful term that never
before existed. But at its heart, adverse possession requires only that
the adverse possessor not be a permitted occupier, to avoid the
problem of ambush. Once that distinction is understood, we can focus
on the information-forcing and notice-providing value of the mark
owner’s productive use.
The trademark owner makes her claim of right when she polices
against infringement. Judge Richard Posner articulated a high standard
for trademark owners who desire to retain their marks: “A serious
trademark holder is assiduous in endeavoring to convince dictionary
editors, magazine and newspaper editors, journalists and columnists,
judges, and other lexicographically influential persons to avoid using his
trademark to denote anything other than the trademarked good or
service.” 137 For the trademark owner, acting like an owner is
particularly critical in determining the scope of the mark’s protection
and whether potentially confusing junior use can be enjoined. Settling
with a competitor who uses a similar or identical mark to sell similar
goods or services can result in weak protection against third parties
using the same mark on less similar goods and services. For example,
when two competitors divided the rights between SUNKIST for fruits
and SUN KIST for vegetables, respectively, the court denied their joint
request to stop the use of SUNKIST as a mark for bread. 138
While Lemley’s focus on proper incentives is important, the broad
rejection of the right to exclude as an incentive is too strong. As David
Friedman has noted, “what we want . . . is not merely an incentive but
the right incentive.” Id. at 1059 (citing David D. Friedman, Law’s
Order 135 (2000)). The mark owner should be encouraged to engage in
activities that provide notice to the public. Thus, focusing on productive
use is more likely to get us to the right incentive in trademark law
because it focuses on the notice function of the use without falling into
the trap of adopting a pure registration system. See also Carrier, supra
note 56, at 82 (“Providing incentives for development is the primary
goal of [intellectual property] . . . .”). Without the right to exclude,
however, mark owners might under produce the information that the
public would otherwise use to distinguish the mark owner’s goods from
those of competitors.
137. Ill. High Sch. Ass’n v. GTE Vantage Inc., 99 F.3d 244, 246 (7th Cir.
1996).
138. Cal. Fruit Growers Exch. v. Sunkist Baking Co., 166 F.2d 971, 976 (7th
Cir. 1947).
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More generally, crowding of a particular word or symbol with
third-party uses narrows the scope of any given mark created using
that word or symbol. 139 For example, in the recent dispute over
trademark rights in Betty Boop, the Ninth Circuit noted that
fractured ownership of the Betty Boop copyrights could make it
difficult for a mark owner to acquire secondary meaning, because use
by other companies may lead to widespread confusion and destroy
secondary meaning in the mark. 140
C.

Exclusivity and Trademark Property

Adverse possession’s exclusivity requirement at first also seems illfitted to describe trademark acquisition, as the trademark owner
acquires no absolute right in any word or symbol. A closer look
clarifies that the trademark owner occupies a particular language unit,
a “trademark lexeme,” and the rights of the trademark owner, like the
rights of the adverse possessor, are circumscribed by her efforts to
delineate and police the boundaries of her claim.
In the adverse possession context, exclusive use means, generally,
the type of exclusive possession that one expects from a record owner
of land of that type. Traditionally, the adverse possessor is treated as
a sole claimant, who through the open, productive occupation of the
land may wrest it from its current, inattentive owner. The exclusivity
requirement means that the adverse possessor cannot take title by
taking advantage of her silence to ambush a record owner or joint
occupant. And perhaps unsurprisingly, the adverse possessor
generally may not secure the title while sharing the property with
the record owner. 141
139. 2 McCarthy, supra note 29, § 11.85 (“[A] mark that is hemmed in on
all sides by similar marks on similar goods cannot be very
‘distinctive.’ ”).
140. Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 654 F.3d 958, 967–68 (9th
Cir. 2011) (citing Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Nintendo Co., 578 F.
Supp. 911, 924–25 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)). The court in Fleischer was,
however, unwilling to grant the defendant’s motion for summary
judgment without more evidence of those negative effects. Id. at 968.
141. See Smith v. Tippett, 569 A.2d 1186, 1190 (D.C. 1990) (“A general
statement of the element of exclusivity is that the adverse claimant’s
possession cannot be shared with the true owner.” (quoting Jacqueline
P. Hand & James Charles Smith, Neighboring Property
Owners § 6.06, at 135 (1988))). But see Nevells v. Carter, 119 A. 62
(Me. 1922) (granting title to adverse possessor who took possession
under color of title from former record owner and then allowed former
record owner to continue to reside on the property). There is
nevertheless some play in the joints. If two adverse possessors occupy
different portions of the same parcel of land, both can secure title to the
portion occupied, so long as neither occupies with permission of the
record owner. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Brantley, 510 F.3d 1256, 1262 (10th
Cir. 2007) (citing Macias v. Guymon Indus. Found., 595 P.2d 430, 434
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Driving the exclusivity requirement is an interest in making sure
that the record owner and potential joint owners are clear about the
scope of the adverse possessor’s claim, 142 as well as allowing the
adverse possessor to stand out from other potential claimants and
users of the property. 143 Such exclusivity has a notice function,
conveying information about the possessor’s claim both to the title
holder and the public. Therein lies the critical similarity between the
exclusivity requirements in adverse possession and trademark
acquisition: failing to exclusively occupy property makes it difficult, if
not impossible, for the record owner or the public to detect the
occupation.
At first glance, this notion of exclusive possession is inconsistent
with the homonymous nature of trademark protection. 144 Trademark
law is premised in part on the notion that a given word or symbol can
have multiple source-signifying meanings—that a given word can
serve as the foundation for more than one trademark. DELTA can
thus designate one source for airline services and another source for
kitchen and bathroom sink faucets. 145 Trademark rights in the word
“Delta” are held by different companies who invest the word with
homonymous meanings: two different things (goods or services from
different sources) are designated by the same word. Just as there may
be multiple meanings of the same word in the public lexicon, there
may be multiple brands utilizing the same or similar words or symbols
n.8 (Okla. 1979)). In addition, the adverse possessor’s claim is not
invalidated by the occasional entry of others, even the record owner.
See, e.g., Smith v. Hayden, 772 P.2d 47, 52 (Colo. 1989) (in banc)
(“[M]ere casual entry for a limited purpose by the record owner is not
necessarily sufficient to prove that the use of the property was joint.”).
In some jurisdictions, where multiple encroachers claim they have
adversely possessed a parcel, title is granted to the adverse possessor
with the better color of title. See Meredith, supra note 131, at 261
142. See Peters v. Juneau-Douglas Girl Scout Council, 519 P.2d 826, 830
(Alaska 1974) (“An owner would have no reason to believe that a
person was making a claim of ownership inconsistent with his own if
that person’s possession was not exclusive, but in participation with the
owner or with the general public.”).
143. See Weyerhaeuser, 510 F.3d at 1261–62 (rejecting adverse possession
defense because defendant “did not use [the property in question] to the
exclusion of the record owner and other permissive users”).
144. Homonyms are words that look or sound like one another but mean
different things. 7 Oxford English Dictionary 343 (2d ed. 1989).
The difference in meaning is attributed to different etymologies, that is,
the words come from different source terms and their current similarity
is accidental. Id.
145. See 4 McCarthy, supra note 29, § 24:11 (“[I]f there is no likelihood of
confusion . . . the same marks can peacefully co-exist on different goods
and services.”).
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for disparate products and services. Thus, the owner of the
STARBUCKS mark does not acquire an exclusive right to all uses of
“star,” “bucks,” or even their compression into a single word, but an
exclusive right use STARBUCKS to identify coffee and those other
goods and services consumers one can expect to find identified by the
STARBUCKS brand. 146 Trademark rights can thus be thought of as a
limited property right in a unit of language.
The difficulty with this homonymous structure, from the mark
owner’s perspective, is that a mark owner who fails to exclusively
occupy her trademark may find that third-party encroachment
interferes with the ability of the mark to convey a singular source for
goods and services to consumers, or the ability of the mark owner to
protect the boundaries of the mark. Exclusivity is required of the
trademark owner even for inherently distinctive marks because failure
to engage in substantially exclusive use narrows the scope of the mark
or entirely forestalls enforcement. 147 This dynamic is manifested in the
split-market problem recognized by courts in the SUNKIST
case. 148 Likewise, for a crowded word, it is difficult for the mark owner
to signal information about the goods on which the mark is used,
because use by others narrows the potential scope of the mark. As
crowding occurs, either with the mark owner’s permission or in the
absence of the mark owner’s best efforts, the mark cannot mean as
broadly as it might have otherwise meant. In essence, by disclaiming
conflicts with close neighbors, or failing to police existing conflicts, the
mark owner disclaims conflicts with distant opponents or new
entrants. The ultimate effect of failing to police the mark, prevent
unauthorized third-party use, and maintain exclusivity is that the
mark will lose its distinctiveness and no longer perform the notice
function consumers relied on. 149 Mark owners who fail to police the
boundaries of the mark may find that it stops conveying the same
information to consumers, or at least that the mark will be treated as
if it no longer conveys that information.
Exclusivity in the trademark context, like exclusivity of possession
of real property, need not be absolute. When tasked with deciding
whether a descriptive mark has acquired sufficient distinctiveness to
qualify for registration, the USPTO can accept “proof of substantially
146. I discuss the concept of trademark lexemes, and the homonymous nature
of trademark law in more detail in another article, The Homonymous
Structure of Trademark Law (on file with author).
147. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
148. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
149. See 3 Louis Altman & Molla Pollack, Callmann on Unfair
Competition, Trademarks and Monopolies § 20:72 (4th ed. 2012)
(“It has been repeatedly held that if there are several users of the mark,
inevitably the mark will lose its distinctiveness.”).
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exclusive and continuous use” of the mark for five years as prima facie
evidence of distinctiveness. 150 The “substantially exclusive” standard
allows the USPTO to discount “inconsequential or infringing” use by
others in determining whether the mark owner has secured rights in
the mark. 151 In the registration context, the existence of some
infringing activity does not necessarily invalidate a claim of exclusive
and continuous use. The fact that other use occurs thus matters less
than whether the trademark owner takes timely action against that
other use.
As this Part has argued, inherently distinctive marks are just like
descriptive marks and property acquired through adverse possession
in the way that notifying use establishes the scope of the property
right. The importance of notifying use highlights the relative
unimportance of hostility as part of the adverse possession regime.
And exclusivity in trademark law, properly understood, is a right in
the lexeme established by the mark owner through use. The next Part
considers the role of the public in the creation and destruction of
trademark rights.

III. Trademark Expiration and
Collective Productive Use
Part II.C considered how requiring some effort from a claimant to
exclusively secure the trademark or the adversely possessed property
serves an important function: engaging in substantially exclusive use
puts the world on notice of the claim. As detailed below, an examination of trademark case law also shows how shifts in trademark
meaning occur through collective, public use of the mark. This Part
considers how the public collectively engages in productive use, both to
create trademarks that are nevertheless capable of private occupation
by mark owners, and to destroy rights in existing marks through ex
post genericness. Here, public use produces results—unlike the general
irrelevance of public use in determining when a copyrighted work or
patented invention falls into the public domain.
As with other property rights, including other intellectual
property rights, 152 trademark protection has limited range. Uses of a
trademark such as nominative fair use, parody, and comparative
advertising are “socially productive uses” that fall outside the reach of
150. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (2006) (emphasis added).
151. See, e.g., L.D. Kichler Co. v. Davoil, Inc., 192 F.3d 1349, 1352 (Fed.
Cir. 1999) (“This makes allowance for use . . . which therefore does not
necessarily invalidate the applicant’s claim.” (quoting TMEP
§ 1212.05(b) (8th ed. Rev. Oct. 2012))).
152. See generally Carrier, supra note 56 (surveying fifty property doctrines
applied to intellectual property regimes).
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the trademark owner. 153 Some productive use also falls outside the
grant of copyright protection. Copyright fair use is an affirmative
defense to a claim of copyright infringement. 154 Fair use is a
sufficiently transformative or productive use of a copyrighted work
and may be made without paying the copyright owner and without
asking permission. 155 These productive use defenses in trademark and
copyright law are primarily seen as individual exceptions to the
intellectual property owner’s rights.
To date, the Supreme Court has resisted the notion that
productive use of a copyrighted work can shift the entitlement in the
work to the public at large, rather than to an individual plaintiff.
Most recently in Golan v. Holder, 156 the Court concluded that
Congress did not violate either the Progress Clause, 157 or the First
Amendment, 158 in restoring copyright protection to works created by
foreigners that fell out of protection because the owners failed to
observe previously required formalities. 159

153. David H. Bernstein & Andrew Gilden, No Trolls Barred: Trademark
Injunctions After eBay, 99 Trademark Rep. 1037, 1072–73 (2009).
154. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 599 (1994)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Fair use is an affirmative defense, so doubts
about whether a given use is fair should not be resolved in favor of the
self-proclaimed parodist.”); Latimer v. Roaring Toyz, Inc., 601 F.3d
1224, 1239 (11th Cir. 2010) (“[F]air use . . . is an affirmative defense
and should be pleaded as such.”). But see Hiram Meléndez-Juarbe,
DRM Interoperability, 15 B.U. J. Sci. & Tech. L. 181, 218 (2009)
(positing that fair use is among copyright law’s “traditional usage
freedoms”); Haochen Sun, Fair Use as a Collective User Right, 90 N.C.
L. Rev. 125, 125 (2011) (conceding that fair use has been treated as an
individual affirmative defense, but urging reconceptualization of fair use
as a collective user right).
155. Judge Leval’s foundational article, which posited transformation was the
crucial element of fair use, utilized “productive” use somewhat
interchangeably with “transformative” use. See Pierre N. Leval, Toward
A Fair Use Standard, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1105, 1111 (1990) (“I believe
the answer to the question of [fair use] justification turns primarily on
whether, and to what extent, the challenged use is transformative. The
use must be productive and must employ the quoted matter in a
different manner or for a different purpose from the original.”); see also
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 478–79,
497 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (focusing on the importance of
productivity manifested through the creation of something new as a
lynchpin of fair use).
156. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012).
157. U.S. Const. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
158. U.S. Const. amend. I.
159 Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 889.
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Petitioners Lawrence Golan and similarly situated plaintiffs
engaged in expressive use of some foreign works that had fallen out of
protection, for which copyright protection would be restored by the
Uruguay Round Agreement Act (“URAA”). 160 The petitioners argued
that providing copyright protection to works that had fallen into the
public domain was beyond Congress’s authority under the Progress
Clause. 161 The Supreme Court concluded instead that the public domain
was not inviolable, and the restoration of protection to select foreign
works was consistent with Congress’s practice of periodically extending
copyright protection to previously unprotected categories of works. 162
The petitioners in Golan also argued that they had vested First
Amendment rights because they had used the unrestored works, then
in the public domain, to create their own expression. 163 The Court saw
the First Amendment argument as simply an alternate ground to
articulate an inviolable public domain, and rejected it. 164 In the
Supreme Court’s view, the shift of patented inventions and copyright
works from private ownership into the public domain occurs
160. Id. at 881–82. The Act also restored copyright protection to foreign
works that never qualified for protection in the first place because either
the author’s home country did not have “copyright relations” with the
United States or the work was a sound recording fixed before 1972. Id.
at 882.
161. Id. at 884.
162. Id. at 887–88. The Court also noted that restored copyright protection
would still expire, and thus the restoration was only for limited times,
consistent with the requirement of the Progress Clause. Id. at 884–85.
163. Id. at 891.
164. See id. at 891–92. (“Petitioners here attempt to achieve under the
banner of the First Amendment what they could not win under the
Copyright Clause . . . .”). The arguments actually differ. An inviolable
public domain argument, grounded in the Progress Clause, would
require that expressive works (and inventions) cannot be propertized by
anyone, even the author, once they reach the public domain. Id. at 891
(citing Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1184 (10th Cir. 2007)). The
First Amendment argument is instead grounded in the use of the work
while in the public domain by the petitioners and those like them, and
could arguably have been limited to those parties who had used the
works productively. In fact, the Court did not embrace the petitioners’
First Amendment claim in part because it seemed unnecessary, given
that Congress eased the burden on those who made use of the restored
works while they were in the public domain. Id. at 891 (“Congress
adopted measures to ease the transition from a national scheme to an
international copyright regime: It deferred the date from which
enforcement runs, and it cushioned the impact of restoration on ‘reliance
parties’ who exploited foreign works denied protection before [the
URAA] took effect.”). For a more detailed discussion of the
constitutionality of the URAA under both the Progress Clause and the
First Amendment, see Jake Linford, Speech and Progress Institutions
(on file with author).
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uniformly and irrespective of potential personal or public engagement
with or investment in those works. 165 Professor McCarthy has defined
intellectual property rights as the “exception” to which the
“[p]ublic domain is the rule.” 166 Assuming McCarthy is correct, the
Court in Golan granted Congress broad power to make exceptions to
this rule, discounting any potential rights “vested” to the public in
copyright expression or patented inventions in the public domain. 167
In other words, the public domain of copyrighted works and patented
inventions is a passive public domain, and works and inventions may
enter and exit the public domain independent of public use.
Like the public domain for copyright and patents, the public
domain from which trademarks are drawn has a passive element.
Trademarks may not be derived either from an ex ante generic
term, 168 or functional elements of trade dress. 169 This is the case even
if the public invests its energy to imbue an unprotectable word or
symbol with source significance. For example, the court in HarleyDavidson, Inc. v. Grottanelli concluded that “[t]he public has no more
right than a manufacturer to withdraw from the language a generic
term, already applicable to the relevant category of products, and
accord it trademark significance.” 170 But this public lexicon also has
an active component. In both the creation of marks and their
dissolution, the public exercises its collective right to occupy lexical
space and establish meanings, some of which can be reduced to
individual property, and others that can never be so reduced.
At first glance, it is odd to suggest the public has a role in
creating trademarks. In litigation, it is the competitor or junior user
who typically stands as proxy for the public interest. 171 Nevertheless,
165. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 892 (“Anyone has free access to the public domain,
but no one, after the copyright term has expired, acquires ownership
rights in the once-protected works.”).
166. 1 McCarthy, supra note 29, § 1.2.
167. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 892–93.
168. See infra Part IV.A.
169. See generally 1 McCarthy, supra note 29, §§ 7:63–7:66 (discussing the
reasons why functional features cannot be protected as trade dress or
trademarks).
170. Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Grottanelli, 164 F.3d 806, 812 (2d Cir. 1999).
171. Margaret Chon, Marks of Rectitude, 77 Fordham L. Rev. 2311, 2330
(2009) (“The underlying rationale of trademark protection is based upon
a decentralized and privatized consumer protection scheme, where
enforcement is provided by competitors, who act as proxies for the
consumers.”). But see Michael Grynberg, Trademark Litigation as
Consumer Conflict, 83 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 60, 63 (2008) (arguing that
while the traditional trademark litigation narrative accounts for
consumer interest by treating the plaintiff as proxy for consumers, who
would seek to prevent confusing uses, courts should also take into
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courts have found that consumer use can create trademark rights, as
was the case when consumers started using “Coke” as a nickname for
Coca-Cola. Eventually, the Coca-Cola Corporation secured rights in
the nickname just like its other trademarks. 172 Consumers also
contribute to the protection of trademarks. Indeed, as Jessica Litman
has astutely observed, trademark owners build the source significance
in their marks “with their customers’ money and active
collaboration.” 173
A trademark can also be extinguished through public use, which I
term ex post genericness. In the typical case, the public uses the mark
to designate the genus of goods, rather than the mark owner’s sourcespecific goods. This effectively adds a generic meaning to the word or
symbol underlying the trademark. When the trademark comes
primarily to represent a genus of goods or services, rather than goods
or services from a particular source, the mark becomes generic, and
the former mark owner loses her rights in the mark. In effect, the
public use swamps, or out-produces, the source significance created by
the mark owner. 174 Thus, when 88 percent of retailers indicated they
knew of no word to describe transparent cellulose film other than
cellophane—DuPont’s purported trademark—the Second Circuit held
the term to be generic. 175
The adverse possession analogy helps clarify that the public can
acquire or exercise something like a property right in the trademark
lexeme. There are both passive property rights in language protected
by Congress and the courts as part of the linguistic commons—that
is, ex ante generic terms and functional symbols—and active property
rights that the public exercises with regards to the use of trademarks
account nonconfused consumers who might have “a significant interest
in the continuation of a defendant’s actions”).
172. See, e.g., Coca-Cola Co. v. Busch, 44 F. Supp. 405, 410 (E.D. Pa. 1942)
(holding that a beverage seller’s use of the term “Koke-Up” was
substantially similar to the common abbreviation for Coca-Cola, and
that such an abbreviation is just as protected as the original
trademark).
173. See Litman, supra note 83, at 1730 (“Producers have invested in their
trade symbols . . . [b]ut so have we. The argument that trade symbols
acquire intrinsic value . . . derives from consumers’ investing those
symbols with value for which they are willing to pay real money.”).
174. See generally 2 McCarthy, supra note 29, § 12:6 (“The standard most
often applied to determine whether a term is generic is not whether it
has some significance to the public as the name of an article, but
whether that is its principal significance.”). Sometimes the mark owner’s
own missteps hasten the process. For example, DuPont’s advertising
used the term cellophane to describe the product, rather than the brand.
DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co., 85 F.2d 75, 80 (1936).
175. DuPont, 85 F.2d at 80.
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that can lead to ex post genericness. In both cases, as Judge Posner
stated, “[a] trademark owner is not allowed to withdraw from the
public domain a name that the public is using to denote someone
else’s good or service, leaving that someone and his customers
speechless.” 176 Sometimes, the court concludes that a term is in public
use and cannot become a trademark in the first instance, and other
times, the court concludes a term that was once a trademark is now a
generic designation.
Drawing a direct analogy between the collective, public use of
trademarks and adverse possession is nevertheless problematic. 177
First, treating generic use of the mark as use under a claim of right
seems particularly discordant. Lexicographers, a frequent target of
cease and desist letters from trademark owners, ostensibly catalog use
as they find it, and have neither the desire nor the intent to claim

176. Ill. High Sch. Ass’n v. GTE Vantage Inc., 99 F.3d 244, 247 (emphasis added).
177. There is a similar problem in drawing an analogy between the
potentially confusing use of junior user and the productive use of the
adverse possessor. Courts and scholars have, in passing, compared the
trademark owner fighting off confusing uses to a record owner fighting
off adverse possessors. See supra note 6. The junior user can bring a
successful laches defense that can prevent a senior user that “sleeps on
his rights” from securing damages for past infringement. See, e.g.,
Herman Miller, Inc. v. Palazzetti Imps. & Exps., Inc., 270 F.3d 298, 322
(6th Cir. 2001) (granting injunctive relief in trademark infringement suit
but denying pre-filing damages on laches grounds). Extreme delay can
even result in the senior user being denied injunctive relief as a remedy.
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Gibraltar Fin. Corp. of Cal., 694 F.2d
1150, 1152 (9th Cir. 1982) (barring injunctive relief because twentyeight-year delay amounted to gross laches). But the junior user who
successfully invokes a laches defense does not strip the mark owner of
any rights in the mark per se, unlike the successful adverse possessor,
who takes title from the record owner. More often, the successful junior
user avoids liability by arguing that his use is not confusing, that is, the
meaning he generates through his trademark use is sufficiently distinct
from the meaning generated by the senior user that the junior user has
not created meaning that would confuse consumers, and thus has not
transgressed the senior user’s trademark right. A court may conclude
that the marks are not confusing because the words or symbols used as
the basis for the respective marks are not sufficiently similar or have
different meanings because the parties’ goods or services are sufficiently
distinct. See Beebe, supra note 115, at 1623–26, 1631–33 (explaining the
similarity and proximity factors of the multifactor test). Furthermore,
marks may not be confusing because the word or symbol used as a mark
by the senior user is already subject to crowding, and the junior user is
merely the latest entrant. “In such a crowd, customers will not likely be
confused between any two of the crowd and may have learned to carefully
pick out one from the other.” 2 McCarthy, supra note 29, § 11:85.
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trademark rights. 178 Indeed, trademark rights are arguably irrelevant
to public, generic use of a trademark.
Second, the analogy between adverse possession and public use
that results in ex post genericness also appears to break down when
we consider exclusivity. Generic use opens up a former trademark
lexeme to use by every competitor. Every manufacturer of transparent
cellulose film can use cellophane as a generic descriptor of their
product. The public is arguably disinterested in engaging in
substantially exclusive use of any sort.
Use that results in ex post genericness is, however, use that strips
from the trademark owner the rights to use the trademark exclusively
as a designation of source and to exclude others from using it in a
manner consistent with that source significance. We might think of
this as a collective exclusivity, preventing only the conversion of the
term to trademark property. This is consistent with rights historically
recognized in commons: members of a community could collectively
exclude outsiders, or collectively decide which uses would be allowed
and which uses would be prevented. 179
This active public domain is particularly important because
trademarks, unlike copyrights and patents, do not necessarily expire,
so long as they are in use. Productive use in the trademark context,
like productive use in the adverse possession context, is relative, and
the stronger, more productive use should win out, even if that
stronger use is sometimes collective use.

IV. Productive Use and Trademark Uncertainty
Parts I and II described how both trademark acquisition and
adverse possession regimes are focused on requiring the property
acquirer to engage in exclusive, notifying use over time in order to
secure the desired property right. Part III fleshed out the important
role of the public in actively shaping the trademark lexicon and the
contours of the trademark public domain, an opportunity effectively
denied the public in the copyright and patent contexts.
This Part addresses some critical differences in the regimes and
what the differences teach about how productive use properly diverges
in the two regimes. Part IV.A explains the difference between ex ante
178. See Shawn M. Clankie, Brand Name Use in Creative Writing:
Genericide or Language Right?, in Perspectives on Plagiarism and
Intellectual Property in a Postmodern World 253, 258 (Lisa
Buranen & Alice M. Roy, eds., 1999) (“[D]ictionaries are key in
determining whether a trademark is being used only as a trademark or
whether . . . it has begun to acquire new forms or uses.”).
179. See Fagundes, supra note 5, at 685 n.146 (differentiating the historical
use of “commons” from “information commons,” the latter referring to
the public domain).
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and ex post genericness and how the phenomena interact with the
general bar on adverse possession of state property held in trust for
the public. Part IV.B details the difference in inherent notice between
physical and intangible property. Part IV.C discusses how the adverse
possessor’s title in fee simple differs from the warehousing ban in
trademark law and highlights the importance of the warehousing ban
by comparing the trademark regime to the domain name registration
system. More specifically, the productive use requirement in trademark law is perpetual, not one that ends once the property right is
acquired. As Part IV.D explains, these differences evidence how the
adverse possession regime is more “crystalline” than the “muddier”
trademark regime, in the sense those terms were first used by Carol
Rose to describe differences in predictability between property
regimes. 180 The uncertainty in the trademark regime, however, is an
important feature of the system, because perpetual productive use
should be a required cost to secure perpetual trademark protection.
A.

Adverse Possession and Public Property

It is commonly understood that property held by the state in
common for the public generally cannot be adversely possessed. 181 For
example, tidelands near the Mississippi Gulf Coast were held in public
trust by the state, and therefore could not be reduced to private
ownership via adverse possession, regardless of the relative value of
the ostensible adverse possession. 182
In the trademark context, Maya Alexandri has argued that
descriptive terms are in the public domain—language held by the
government “in trust for the populace.” 183 Recognizing this general
180. See generally Rose, Crystals, supra note 15.
181. Compare Cinque Bambini P’ship v. State, 491 So. 2d 508, 521 (Miss.
1986) (en banc) (“The State’s title may not be lost via adverse
possession, limitations or laches.”), with Mountain States Tel. & Tel.
Co. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 472 U.S. 237, 244 (1985) (noting that the
Pueblo Lands Act of 1924 allowed non-Indian possessors of Pueblo grant
lands to extinguish a Pueblo’s title, if the non-Indian had continuously,
openly, and notoriously adversely possessed the land and paid taxes).
But see Burgess v. Gilman, 475 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1061–62 (D. Nev.
2007) (concluding that service marks seized by the government from the
Mustang Ranch brothel were not abandoned by temporary misuse while
in government hands, in part because of the general rule that
government property cannot be adversely possessed). See also generally,
R.P. Davis, Acquisition by Adverse Possession or Use of Public
Property Held by Municipal Corporation or Other Governmental Unit
Otherwise than for Streets, Alleys, Parks, or Common, 55 A.L.R.2d 554
(1957).
182. Cinque Bambini, 491 So. 2d at 510–11.
183. Maya Alexandri, The International News Quasi-Property Paradigm and
Trademark Incontestability: A Call for Rewriting the Lanham Act, 13
Harv. J.L. & Tech. 303, 320 (2000).
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rule would prevent any attempt by a hopeful mark owner to quiet
title in a descriptive mark. Technically, the same rationale could be
applied to any mark. Most word marks appropriate words currently in
use with pre-existent meanings. 184 Even fanciful trademarks are
derived from common language elements. Thus, an absolute bar on
the adverse possession of public property could arguably apply to the
acquisition of any trademark, because the morphemes and phonemes
comprising every word mark are in the public domain. 185
Note, however, that the general rule against adversely possessing
public property does not apply universally, and is in fact shot through
with exceptions. 186 In some jurisdictions adverse possession can occur
when the property at issue is not used for public purposes but held by
the state for private or community-specific purposes. 187 Several states
also boast statutes that expressly allow adverse possession of state or
municipal property. 188
Trademarks, while drawn from the public domain, have been
designated as subject to private ownership. The Lanham Act protects
both registered and unregistered trademarks. 189 Most state legislatures
184. See supra notes 29–30, 111, 114, 135–137 and accompanying text.
185. A morpheme is a fragment of a written word. See, e.g., Richard R.
Klink, Creating Meaningful Brands: The Relationship Between Brand
Name and Brand Mark, 14 Marketing Letters 143, 144 (2003)
(describing how marketers embed words within brand names). A
phoneme is a sound, essentially a syllabic building block. Ross D. Petty,
Naming Names: Trademark Strategy and Beyond: Part One—Selecting
a Brand Name, 15 J. Brand Mgmt. 190, 194 (2008) (explaining that
certain sounds have common associations with products and marketers
seek to use sounds to create a distinct brand name).
186. See, e.g., Richert v. City of San Diego, 293 P. 673, 676 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1930) (holding that public land which is not reserved or dedicated
to public use can be adversely possessed). See also generally Paula R.
Latovick, Adverse Possession Against the States: The Hornbooks Have
It Wrong, 29 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 939, 939 (1996) (explaining how
“[f]ew states simply and explicitly protect all state land from adverse
possession”).
187. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Middlebrooke, 32 N.E. 457, 458 (Ill. 1892)
(vacant lot owned by the city but not held for public use was not
exempt from the statute of limitations for real actions). But see, e.g.,
City of Gainesville v. Gilliland, 718 S.W.2d 553, 565 (Mo. Ct. App.
1986) (holding that private land conveyed to the city could not be
adversely possessed).
188. See, e.g., State v. Harman, 50 S.E. 828, 829 (W. Va. 1905) (holding that
wild land not used in government administration was subject to adverse
possession under the statute of limitations because state owned land was
subject to the statute of limitations unless specifically exempted). See
also generally Davis, supra note 181, § 31(a) (listing states that allow
adverse possession for public lands).
189. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1125(a) (2006).
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have created registration regimes and expressly recognize common law
rights in trademarks. 190 As both the federal and state governments
have carved out statutory trademark protection, the general objection
that adverse possession cannot claim public property should not apply
to most trademarks.
Congress has, however, arguably held one source material “in
trust for the populace” that cannot be drawn out of public domain
through trademark use: the generic term that functions only to
designate the genus of the good or service offered, at the moment of
first use. The registration of such an ex ante generic term is not
allowed, because such a term is effectively held in common for the
public to enable competitors to bring products to market or offer
services identified in a way that allows consumers to find competing
products or service. 191 Note that only ex ante generic terms are barred
from trademark appropriation in this way. Marks that become generic
ex post, like SINGER once became a generic designation for the
owner’s formerly patented sewing machines, 192 can still be
rehabilitated through the efforts of the mark owner. 193 Thus, while
real property held in common for the public generally cannot be
adversely possessed, it is most reasonable to understand that ex ante
generic terms are the only terms “held in common” in a fashion that
prevents them from being converted to some level of private
ownership.

190. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 495.161 (West 2010) (Florida registration
regime does not preempt common law protection); § 495.031
(establishing state trademark registration regime); see also Allan J.
Sternstein et al., Corporate Compliance Series: Designing An Effective
Intellectual Property Compliance Program, Nov. 2012, § 4:42, available
at Corp. Compl. Series Intell. Prop. 4:42 (Westlaw) (providing a fifty
state survey of trademark laws).
191. The Lanham Act uses “generic” to describe abandonment via ex post
genericness, but does not explicitly discuss ex ante genericness. 15
U.S.C. § 1127 (defining “abandonment”). Professor McCarthy suggests
that while 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) refers specifically to the cancellation of a
mark on genericness grounds, it should also apply to the initial attempt
to register a generic term. 2 McCarthy, supra note 29, § 12:5 n.6; see
also Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 116 (1938) (“Since
the term [shredded wheat] is generic, the original maker of the product
acquired no exclusive right to use it.”).
192. Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169 (1896).
193. Singer Mfg. Co. v. Briley, 207 F.2d 519, 520 n.3 (5th Cir. 1953)
(affirming that the mark owner had “by the constant and exclusive use
of the name ‘Singer’ in designating sewing machines and other articles
manufactured and sold by it and in advertising the same continuously
and widely—recaptured from the public domain the name ‘Singer’ ”);
see also supra note 146 and accompanying text.
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B.

Physical v. Intangible Property

Any comparison of the acquisition of real or personal property
with the acquisition of intellectual or intangible property must take
into account the ways that physical property differs from intangible
property. A trademark is a lexeme that includes both the word or
symbol recognized and the connection to the goodwill of the producer.
Trademarks are not physical property. On the other hand, real and
personal property have an explicit corporeal manifestation.
Real property is also fixed in physical space in a way that a
trademark never can be. The permanence of the physical location of
real property performs a natural notice function that trademarks, or
even personal property, cannot. Real property bearing on its face
indicia of active use or ownership provides some notice merely
through its consistent presence in a fixed location.
On the other hand, adverse possession of personal property (also
known as “chattel property”) has been rejected by courts when they
recognize that open and notorious use of personal property “may not
be sufficient to put the original owner on actual or constructive notice
of the identity of the possessor.” 194 Like personal property, trademarks
have a physical manifestation when they are affixed to goods, but
affixation is no longer the sine qua non of trademark protection. And
like other regimes protecting nonrivalrous goods, 195 it can be difficult
to detect trademark infringement. 196 In light of these differences,
securing rights in a trademark should require a higher level of notice
than acquiring real property through adverse possession. The next
subpart details how the antiwarehousing principle in trademark law
establishes this higher desired level of notice through the trademark
regime’s continual use requirement.
C.

Warehousing and the Domain Name System

The differences between adverse possession and trademark
acquisition are not limited to differences in corporeal manifestation.
While both the adverse possessor and the trademark owner must
194. Michael Allan Wolf, Taking Regulatory Takings Personally: The Perils
of (Mis)reasoning by Analogy, 51 Ala. L. Rev. 1355, 1368 (2000)
(quoting O’Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 867 (N.J. 1980)).
195. David W. Barnes, A New Economics of Trademarks, 5 Nw. J. Tech. &
Intell. Prop. 22, 55–56 (2006) (arguing that trademarks are impure
public goods with nonrivalrous characteristics).
196. Irina D. Manta, The Puzzle of Criminal Sanctions for Intellectual
Property Infringement, 24 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 469, 507 n.241 (2011).
But see Paul Heald, Comment, Money Damages and Corrective
Advertising: An Economic Analysis, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 629, 646
(1988) (arguing that the chance of nondetection of trademark
infringement is low because “a trademark has a conspicuous public
presence”).
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engage in continuous use to acquire their respective rights, the
trademark owner never secures title in fee simple. Unlike rights in real
property, or even intellectual property rights like copyright or patent
protection, trademark rights are property rights dependent upon
perpetual use of the property held.
Failure to use a mark in commerce leads to its abandonment, no
matter the strength of the mark, and even if the mark had previously
been used for an extended period of time. 197 This is true not only for
actual use of the mark in commerce, which secures common law
rights, but also for trademark registrations. The owner of a trademark
registration must file an affidavit of continuing use after the first six
years of registration, 198 and then every ten years, 199 to retain the
registration. 200 If the mark is no longer used for any of those goods or
services, the registration can be cancelled for abandonment. 201 But like
title to real property in fee simple, the trademark owner who
continuously uses the mark in commerce can control the mark
perpetually—a key difference between the trademark regime and the
protection for limited times afforded to copyrights and patents. 202
While real property, like patents and copyrights, generally may be
“warehoused” or held idle, trademarks may not. 203
Even this difference between the acquisition of real property and
trademark rights is not as stark as it first appears. Real property may
be left idle in perpetuity, so long as the record owner meets its
obligations to monitor the property against adverse possessors. In this
way, the continual use requirement imposed on the trademark owner
is somewhat similar to the adverse possession regime generally,
because both regimes include a mechanism whereby the inactive
owner can lose property held idle. For the adverse possessor, the title
197. See, e.g., ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 373 F. Supp. 2d 275, 284–85
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that an Indian restaurant’s nonuse of its
trademark for more than three years was enough to constitute
abandonment).
198. 15 U.S.C. § 1058(a)(1) (2006).
199. Id. § 1058(a)(3).
200. See 1 Anne Gilson LaLonde, Gilson on Trademarks § 4.03 (2011)
(discussing the process of canceling and retaining a trademark).
201. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1064(3), 1119; see also supra note 93.
202. Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Copyright Lawmaking Authority: An
(Inter)Nationalist Perspective on the Treaty Clause, 30 Colum. J.L. &
Arts 355, 372 (2007).
203. See, e.g., Harod v. Sage Prods., Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1369, 1379 (S.D.
Ga. 2002) (“Plaintiffs . . . failed to make significant use of the
[registered] mark, and the law does not permit them to waste their
rights in this mark where Defendant can and has put the mark to
productive use.”).
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acquired in fee simple is only as good as her ability to prevent
subsequent adverse possession. Thus, in any property regime that uses
adverse possession as an equitable backstop, the title in fee simple is
subject to transfer if the record owner becomes inattentive. This
monitoring requirement is the focus of some criticism of the adverse
possession regime, 204 but as a result, the duration of the right in real
property in an adverse possession regime differs from the trademark
right in degree, not in kind.
One can see the importance of the bar on warehousing in
trademark law when comparing the productive use trademark regime
with the registration-only regime for acquiring domain names. 205
Domain names are limited resources, much like real property, in that
only one person can own a given domain name. Domain name
registrations are also first-come, first-served. 206 Domain name
registrars are not required to ask whether a registrant uses the word
that makes up the domain name as part of a business, or has other
preexisting interests in it, 207 and early on in the history of domain
name registrations, neither were registrants. Enterprising domain
name registrants soon realized they could acquire domain names that
included a well-known brand or the name of a celebrity. This practice
conflicted with established trademark and publicity rights, and was
inconsistent with the concept of notifying productive use. As Anupam
Chander noted, this first-in-time domain name policy did a poor job
of guaranteeing that the first mover would be the person who can
make the most productive use of a domain name. 208
Initially, aggrieved trademark owners sought relief through
actions for trademark dilution, but that provided relief only to the

204. See, e.g., Patty Gerstenblith, The Adverse Possession of Personal
Property, 37 Buff. L. Rev. 119, 156 (1989) (arguing that the danger of
transfer through adverse possession leads owners to engage in inefficient
monitoring).
205. A domain name is a unique address on the Internet, like <uspto.gov>.
206. See Ughetta Manzone, Recent Case, Panavision International, L.P. v.
Toeppen, 13 Berkley Tech. L.J. 249, 249 (1998) (describing the
domain name registration regime prior to the passage of the ACPA and
the adoption of the UDRP); Gillian K. Hadfield, Essay, Privatizing
Commercial Law: Lessons from ICANN, 6 J. Small & Emerging Bus.
L. 257, 272 (2002) (“The UDRP as [then] currently implemented, for
example, reflects a choice to allow first-come-first-serve registration . . .
without contacting alternative potential users of the name or resolving
competing claims among them.”).
207. A domain name registrar is an entity that manages the reservation of
Internet domain names.
208. Anupam Chander, The New, New Property, 81 Tex. L. Rev. 715, 746–
47 (2003).
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strongest marks. 209 The response, both nationally and internationally,
was to allow trademark owners to inject relative merit of the
productive use of the mark owner and the registrant into processes for
resolving disputes over domain names. Congress passed the
Anticybersquatting Protection Act (ACPA) in 1999 to deal with the
problem. 210 Under the ACPA, trademark owners can seek the transfer
of domain names from registrants who register, traffic in, or use a
domain name. 211 There are two overarching conditions for the
transfer. First, the domain name must be identical or confusingly
similar to a distinctive mark, or identical, confusingly similar to, or
dilutive of a famous mark. 212 Second, the domain name must have
been registered with “a bad faith intent to profit” from the mark. 213
The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
(ICANN), tasked with coordinating the global Internet systems for
the United States and others, worked closely with the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) to draft a Uniform
Domain-Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP). 214 The UDRP also
provides a transfer remedy. Under the UDRP, a complainant can
obtain the transfer of a domain name if the domain name is identical
or confusingly similar to the complainant’s mark, if the registrant has
“no rights or legitimate interests” in the domain name, and if the
domain name was registered in bad faith. 215

209. See, e.g., Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296, 1301
(C.D. Cal. 1996) (“Trademark dilution laws protect ‘distinctive’ or
‘famous’ trademarks . . . .”), aff’d, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998).
210. Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113 tit. III,
113 Stat. 1501A-545 (1999) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)
(2006)); see also Ford Motor Co. v. Greatdomains.com, Inc., 177 F. Supp.
2d 635, 655 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (“[T]he ACPA appropriately regulates the
otherwise ‘first-come, first-serve’ policy of distributing domain names by
taking into account the legitimate competing interests that might exist in
a given domain name.”).
211. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(d)(1)(C), (d)(2).
212. Id. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii).
213. Id. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i). Trademark owners can also seek damages for
domain names registered after the passage of the ACPA. Id. § 1117(d).
214. 5 Gilson, supra note 200, § 30.08 (noting that the UDRP was proposed
in part due to dissatisfaction with the role that Network Solutions, the
sole registrar for domain names under the .com, .net and .org Top-Level
Domain Names, played as a trademark dispute tribunal); see also UDRP
Opinion Guide, Harvard L. Sch., http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/udrp/
opinion (last visited Apr. 6, 2013) (organizing and summarizing the
opinions issued by UDRP panelists).
215. Uniform Domain Name Resolution Policy, ICANN, § 4(a) (Oct. 24, 1999),
http://www.icann.org/en/help/dndr/udrp/policy [hereinafter UDRP].
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Bad faith in both dispute resolution systems, however, is
determined in large part by the relative value of use that the domain
name registrant makes of the domain name and the trademark that
comprises it, and the value of the trademark owner’s use of the
mark. 216 In both systems, disputes are resolved by considering the bad
faith of the registrant; the productive use of the registrant, the
complaining mark owner, and other mark owners; and the relative
identity rights of registrant and mark owner.
So called “cybersquatters” are those who secure domain names
comprised of trademarks to sell them to the mark owner at prices
higher than the cost of registration. Both systems flag the intent to
sell the domain name as evidence of problematic “bad faith.”217
Moreover, commercial gain cuts against the registrant in other
contexts. 218 Intent to divert consumers from the mark owner’s site,219
or otherwise disrupt an established business interest, 220 may also
indicate bad faith. Bad faith is further indicated by providing false
contact information to the domain name registrar, 221 and registering
multiple distinctive or famous marks. 222 There are, however,
productive uses in which a registrant can engage that push back
against a finding of bad faith registration. The registrant has a
stronger case if she has used the mark to sell her own goods or
services 223 or to engage in noncommercial or fair use of a trademark. 224
216. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i); UDRP, supra note 215, § 4(b). The UDRP
explicitly acknowledges that its bad faith inquiry measures the
registrant’s rights or legitimate interests, or lack thereof, with regard to
the domain name. UDRP, supra note 215, § 4(a)(ii). The report from
the House Committee on the Judiciary noted the same balancing act
was at the heart of the ACPA. See H.R. Rep. No. 106-412, at 10
(1999) (stating that the ACPA bad faith factors “are designed to
balance the property interests of trademark owners with the legitimate
interests of Internet users”).
217. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(VI); UDRP, supra note 215, § 4(b)(i).
218. UDRP, supra note 215, § 4(b)(iv), (c)(iii).
219. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(V).
220. UDRP, supra note 215, § 4(b)(i)–(iii).
221. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(VII).
222. Id. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(VIII). The UDRP also considers engaging in a
pattern of registering domain names to prevent mark owners from
reflecting the mark in a domain name as evidence of registration and use
in bad faith. UDRP, supra note 215, § 4 (b)(ii).
223. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(III); UDRP, supra note 215, § 4(c)(i).
224. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(IV); UDRP, supra note 215, § 4(c)(iii); see
also H.R. Rep. No. 106-412, at 10 (1999) (describing “lawful uses of
others’ marks” as “including for purposes such as comparative
advertising, comment, criticism, parody, news reporting, fair use, etc.”);
supra notes 153–55 and accompanying text.
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Both systems treat trademark rights as indicative of superior
rights to use the domain name consisting of that mark. Both systems
weigh the mark owner’s trademark rights, 225 the distinctiveness or
fame of the mark in question, 226 and even “other intellectual property
rights,” 227 in the mark owner’s favor. As noted above, both systems
disfavor the registrant who registers multiple distinctive or famous
marks. Both systems implicitly accept pre-existing trademark rights
as evidence that the owner of those rights will engage in more
productive use of the domain name than the domain name registrant.
Chander critiques the presumption, noting that not every mark owner
will necessarily engage in more productive use. 228 But it is not
unreasonable to think that a trademark owner might be more likely to
engage in productive use of a domain name incorporating her mark
than a domain name registrant who has no pre-existing interest, and
even lacks plans to use the domain name to offer goods and services.
In addition to trademark rights, the ACPA provides a cause of
action for those whose personal name is protected as a mark.229
Another provision of the Act establishes civil liability for registering a
domain name consisting of the name of another living person (or a
confusingly similar variation) without consent for the purpose of
selling the domain name to that person or a third party. 230 The UDRP
limits its protection to trademarks, 231 although UDRP panelists have
recognized that personal names can acquire distinctiveness. 232 And
both systems recognize the legitimacy of domain registrants who have
a pre-existing identity associated with the domain name registered.233
225. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(I); UDRP, supra note 215, § 4(a)(i), (b)(i)–(ii).
226. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(IX).
227. Id. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(I); see also UDRP, supra note 215, § 4(c)(ii).
228. See Chander, supra note 208, at 747 (“[T]he system does a poor job of
ensuring that domain names end up in the hands of the persons who
value them most.”).
229. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A).
230. Id. § 8131(1)(A); see also Bogoni v. Gomez, 847 F. Supp. 2d 519
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (holding that a domain registrant who purchased
multiple versions of a philanthropist’s real name and tried to sell each
domain name for $1,000,000 violated the ACPA).
231. See Jacqueline D. Lipton, Who Owns “Hillary.com”? Political Speech
and the First Amendment in Cyberspace, 49 B.C. L. Rev. 55, 62 (2008)
(describing how registration of a politician’s name will not violate the
UDRP unless the name is “trademarked or trademarkable”).
232. See, e.g., Roberts v. Boyd, No. D2000-0210, 2000 WL 33674395 (WIPO
Arb. & Mediation Ctr. May 29, 2000) (finding that Julia Roberts had
acquired a common law trademark in her name and transferring
<juliaroberts.com> to the actress).
233. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(II); UDRP, supra note 215, § 4(c)(ii).
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For example, one registrant, Michael Urvan, who had been known as
“Sting,” prevailed in a UDRP action against Gordon Sumner, the
former bassist and lead singer of The Police, even though Sumner was
arguably the more famous “Sting.” 234
Both the ACPA and the UDRP insert a productive use
requirement as an equitable limit on the ownership of a domain name,
much the same way that adverse possession serves as an equitable
limit on the warehousing of real property. 235 The simple economic
story about the alienation of property presupposes that, so long as
transaction costs are sufficiently low, it matters not who initially
holds the property right, because the highest-value user will be able to
negotiate for the property. 236 Inserting a cause of action for trademark
owners into the domain name registration process suggests a distrust
of the market in reaching the most efficient result. 237
D.

Mud and Crystals in Property Acquisition Regimes

As discussed above, the property right in a trademark must be
consistently re-earned through productive use, while real property
acquired through adverse possession can be held idle for the most part.
The regimes also differ importantly in their clarity about how long it
takes to secure those rights. The initial acquisition of a descriptive
mark must be continuous for long enough to develop secondary
meaning, prior to competing uses by others. The Patent and
Trademark Office has the discretion, under section 2(f) of the Lanham
Act, to treat a descriptive term as though it has acquired secondary
meaning and grant a registration based on five years of substantially
exclusive and continuous use of the mark. Outside that soft
presumption,238 there is little clarity regarding how long it will take the
mark owner to obtain secondary meaning, commercial strength, or fame
in the market. In fact, courts continuously disclaim that any given
amount of time is either sufficient or necessary to develop secondary
meaning. 239 This is different than the adverse possession regime, where
every state sets a clear, statutorily defined period after which the
adverse possessor’s use will lead to a transfer of rights.
In considering the development of property rules over time, Carol
Rose describes some rules as formal, hard-edged, and occasionally
234. Sumner v. Urvan, No. D2000-0596, 2000 WL 33939204 (WIPO Arb. &
Mediation Ctr. Jul. 24, 2000).
235. See supra note 204.
236. See Chander, supra note 208, at 720 (explaining that as long as
transaction costs are minimal an “efficient outcome will be reached”).
237. Id. at 781–91.
238. See supra notes 101–03 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 108–109 and accompanying text.
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merciless. 240 These rules are “crystal,” providing certainty to property
owners about the scope of their rights, which allows them to better
plan for the future. 241 While the adverse possession factors might lead
one to see the regime as grounding title on meeting a “muddy” or
imprecise standard, 242 the adverse possessor’s ability to rely on a
precise statutorily required period of possession before title vests
provides greater certainty than trademark law’s secondary meaning
inquiry. Providing the adverse possessor with a title grant
commensurate with the bounds of her fence, or the property borders
described in her color of title, is another relatively crystalline rule. So
long as productive use occurs somewhere within the borders of the
property, the bright line of borders or documentation defines the
boundaries of the property right.
Comparing the regimes lays bare the muddiness inherent in the
trademark system. One of the characteristics of muddy property rules
is that they grant more discretion to decisionmakers after the fact,243
and so for many muddy rules, it is difficult to know the scope of an
entitlement until it is litigated. 244 In that way, the likelihood-ofconfusion test is prototypically muddy.
Some facets of trademark protection are relatively crystalline, but
the crystallization we see in the trademark system is undercut by
common law developments in several ways. For example, the
relatively clear cut distinctiveness categories are muddied when the
acquisition of commercial strength becomes more dispositive than
inherent strength in determining whether the mark can be enforced. 245
There are few periods of certainty for the mark owner to rely on in
securing secondary meaning or commercial strength, which
compounds the problem. 246 With regard to the commercial strength
factor, this tendency is less troubling when viewed through the
adverse possession lens because it is consistent use over time, not
mere initial possession, that communicates to consumers the source
240. See Rose, Crystals, supra note 15, at 577–78 (“Property law . . . has
always been heavily laden with hard-edged doctrines that tell everyone
exactly where they stand.”).
241. Id. at 595.
242. Guy Pessach, Reciprocal Share-Alike Exemptions in Copyright Law, 30
Cardozo L. Rev. 1245, 1285–86 (2008) (characterizing adverse
possession as a muddy standard).
243. See Rose, Crystals, supra note 15, at 591.
244. Id. at 581.
245. See Beebe, supra note 115, at 1636 (“For example, courts found marks
to be inherently weak but commercially strong in twenty-three of the
opinions sampled.”).
246. See supra notes 101–103 and accompanying text.
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significance of the mark. 247 With regard to the absence of a clear
duration window, the adverse possession parallel helps us recognize
that trademark protection is a stepped process where extended
periods of use bring more extensive rights. The temporal uncertainty
of the length-of-use requirement to secure trademark rights is less
troubling than it might first appear because it pushes us back toward
recognizing use in commerce as the foundation of trademark rights.
The claim to a mark stems not from the duration of use but instead
from continuation of the use, and that is as it should be.
Likewise, the tendency of most courts to weaken the presumption
of strength for incontestable marks where there is an indication that
the mark is in fact commercially weak muddies the rule to the benefit
of competition. 248 Here, courts seem interested in getting “right
results” where a bright-line rule might wreak havoc or work an
injustice. That same instinct may motivate the guidance given
examining attorneys at the USPTO to consider the type of mark
before applying the section 2(f) presumption in favor of finding
secondary meaning and registering a descriptive mark after five years
of use. 249 Not every court, unfortunately, takes a close look at
incontestable marks. In a handful of jurisdictions, courts presume that
incontestable marks are inherently strong, based simply on
registration status. 250 Similarly, the presumption that registered
descriptive marks have acquired secondary meaning somewhat
undermines the value of uncertainty about the time it takes to acquire
commercial strength and secondary meaning as a way to keep the
mark owner on her toes, commercially speaking. 251
Trademark protection is relatively crystalline at registration, but
trademark litigation, centered as it is around the likelihood-of247. The law errs in exactly the other direction for assertion of trademark
protection. It is not the goods defined in the registration that define the
scope of protection, but the use that defines the scope of the
registration. Where a mark owner fails to offer the goods or services in
commerce under that mark, she will lose the registration, at least for
unused goods and services. See supra text accompanying note 201.
248. See, e.g., Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon, Inc. v. Alpha of Va., Inc., 43
F.3d 922, 933 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that “the district court
erroneously relied on incontestability as being dispositive”).
249. See supra notes 101–103 and accompanying text.
250. See, e.g., Wynn Oil Co. v. Am. Way Serv. Corp., 943 F.2d 595, 600
(6th Cir. 1991) (presuming the mark was strong since it had been
registered and uncontested for five years); see also infra note 282 and
accompanying text. This is inconsistent with the productive use
requirement for reasons discussed in Part V.A.
251. See Packman v. Chi. Tribune Co., 267 F.3d 628, 638 (7th Cir. 2001)
(noting that a registered mark is presumed to have acquired secondary
meaning).
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confusion inquiry, muddies up the trademark right considerably. The
lack of certainty regarding trademark rights may cause some problems
not only for mark owners, but also for their competitors and the
public. 252 David Fagundes has argued persuasively that more
crystalline boundaries of copyright protection, which would provide
greater certainty about the scope of copyright ownership, could also
sharpen boundaries to help clearly delineate the public domain. For
example, copyright fair use is a muddy defense. 253 Fagundes argues
that creating clear safe harbors for fair use may aid some fair users by
helping them identify activities they can clearly engage in without the
permission of the copyright owner and without the fear of triggering
copyright liability. 254
It is not true in every case, however, that crystallization will
benefit the public. For example, the Lanham Act grants constructive
nationwide first use from the time a registrant files a section 1(b)
“intent-to-use” (ITU) application. The ITU application thus reserves
lexical space to the trademark owner prior to actual use in a way that
we might find out of sync with the productive use requirement. 255 In
WarnerVision Entertainment Inc. v. Empire of Carolina, Inc., 256
Empire of Carolina held an ITU application to use REAL WHEELS
as a mark for toy vehicles, but had not yet begun selling toys under
the REAL WHEELS mark when WarnerVision began selling video
cassettes packaged with toy cars under the REAL WHEELS mark. 257
On appeal, the Second Circuit held that Empire of Carolina could not
be enjoined from using its mark in commerce, obtaining a section 1(a)
use-based registration, and acquiring priority dating back to the date
of the section 1(b) ITU application. 258 The court concluded that to
allow another’s subsequent use in commerce to cut off the ability of
the prior ITU applicant to develop rights in the mark would run
counter to congressional intent and “encourage unscrupulous
252. See generally David Fagundes, Crystals in the Public Domain, 50 B.C.
L. Rev. 139 (2009) (suggesting that clearer rules about the scope of
copyright protection might better enable public domain uses).
253. Id. at 151.
254. See id. at 151–53 (discussing how the muddy rules involving fair use
favor owners at the expense of users). I discuss a similar proposal for
crystallizing trademark timelines for the public benefit in Part V.B.
255. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051(b), 1057(c) (2006) (describing how a trademark
may be registered before use); see also supra notes 90–94 and
accompanying text.
256. WarnerVision Entm’t Inc. v. Empire of Carolina, Inc., 101 F.3d 259 (2d
Cir. 1996).
257. Id. at 260–61.
258. See id. at 262 (“To permit such an injunction would eviscerate the ITU
provisions and defeat their very purpose.”).

755

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 3 ·2013
Trademark Owner as Adverse Possessor

entrepreneurs to look in the record for new [intent-to-use] applications
by large companies, rush in to make a few sales under the same
mark,” and extort a settlement to permit the ITU applicant to
proceed with its plans for the mark. 259
While registration is notice-providing, granting priority based
only on bona-fide intent to use the property moves somewhat far
afield from the productive use principle. 260 But this is not much
different than using color of title or fencing to set the boundaries of
constructive possession. The ITU application only matures to an
actual application once the mark owner uses the mark in commerce.261
So long as the USTPO is diligent in assuring that ITU applications
either mature to use-based applications or eventually run out of
extensions, the danger posed by ITU applications is fairly limited. To
the extent the USPTO has not diligently policed ITU applications,
that oversight should be corrected.
In the end, predictability in property regimes, or the lack thereof,
matters to both property owners and those who allegedly infringe
property rights. Mark Lemley’s general rejection of analogies between
real and intellectual properties is driven by a desire to focus attention
on the alleged rights of the intellectual property owner, and not the
free riding of the alleged infringer, when considering whether to
extend the scope of intellectual property protection. 262 Turning away
from the alleged infringer is just as monotonic as turning solely to her.
Instead, we should weigh the relative value the uses bring to the
table. That’s what fair use does in copyright law: preserving space for
those productive uses that we might value more highly than the
ability of the copyright owner to control the work or extract rents for
it. Perhaps those courts reviewing asserted trademark claims have
failed because they’ve missed the significance of the productive use
requirement. The similarities between adverse possession and
trademark acquisition, outlined in Parts I and II, ideally remind us of
the importance of productive use.
259. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 2 McCarthy on Trademarks
§ 19.08[1][d] (3d ed. 1992)). Congress apparently created the intent-touse application in part to respond to the prior muddying of the use rule
which allowed registration based on token use, that is, without genuine
use in commerce. Daniel R. Bereskin, Miles J. Alexander & Nadine
Jacobson, Bona Fide Intent to Use in the United States and Canada,
100 Trademark Rep. 709, 717 (2010) (reporting that the “bona fide”
requirement in the intent-to-use standard was designed to eliminate
“token use”).
260. See Mossoff, supra note 74, at 423 (“This amendment to trademark law
represents in principle an illegitimate ‘land grab.’ ”).
261. See supra notes 90–94 and accompanying text.
262. See Lemley, Free Riding, supra note 2, at 1068 (“The proper focus is on
the intellectual property owner, not the accused infringer.”).
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Part IV of this Article tackles the problem from the other side,
recognizing that the differences in the regimes affirms the importance
of continual use in a properly functioning trademark regime. Scholars
like John Duffy argue that the value in comparing real and
intellectual property comes from the attempt to unify all potential
property regimes under a single umbrella, much like “the relentless
push to reduce the number of natural laws so that ‘[m]ore and more
apparently diverse phenomena are explained by fewer and fewer
underlying principles.’ ” 263 To Duffy, unification “may help guide
policymakers to wise law” because “each additional unification brings
new insight.” 264 In light of the analysis in Part IV, I am not persuaded
that unification should be our primary goal, because the exceptions
can overtake the general rule.
In the end, the differences in regimes matter nearly as much as
the similarities. Recognizing the productive use requirement helps
clarify that our adverse possession and trademark acquisition regimes
should incentivize communicative, productive use. To the extent that
either regime falls short of that mark, it should be readjusted. This
Article makes a few proposals in that spirit in Part V.

V. Interventions
From the preceding analysis, this Article proposes three main
interventions, two for trademark law and one for adverse possession.
First, while scholars have argued in favor of curtailing the
incontestability of descriptive marks or denying protection to them
altogether, the productive use analysis suggests that the process of
acquiring secondary meaning is valuable both because it incentivizes
productive use and because the process has a natural notice-providing
function. It is critical to ensure such protection for descriptive marks
is consistent with the productive use rationale. Thus, the USPTO
should take a closer look at affidavits of incontestability, at least for
descriptive marks, and those courts that presume a mark is strong
because it is incontestable should reconsider that presumption.
Second, the Article proposes various tweaks to crystallize the
abandonment window as well as the time required to acquire
distinctiveness or develop commercial strength and acknowledges
potential problems that might result. Finally, the Article recommends
moving away from the bad faith conundrum in adverse possession
because the intent of the possessor has little relevance to the
productivity of her use or the notice it provides.

263. Duffy, supra note 5, at 1090 (quoting John C. Taylor, Hidden Unity
in Nature’s Laws xi (2001)).
264. Id.
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Descriptive Marks, Risk, and Reward

Several scholars have challenged the protectability of descriptive
terms as marks, both because of their inherent and irrevocable public
nature, and because some descriptive marks that never acquired
secondary meaning slip through the USPTO and become
incontestable. The productive use rationale for trademark acquisition
makes clear that these concerns are somewhat overstated (the first
more so than the second), so long as productive use is actually
required before descriptive marks are protected. The process for
acquiring protection of, and even incontestability for, a descriptive
mark is consistent with the notice function of productive use because
it signals the relative value that the mark owner, competitors, and the
public place on respective uses of the mark. In addition, the
commercial-use requirement provides an important check on the
danger of error on the part of the USPTO in granting incontestability
to descriptive marks.
Some scholars have advocated abolishing protection for
descriptive marks altogether. Secondary meaning is hard to prove, so
banning protection of descriptive marks would arguably avoid that
“nightmarish undertaking.” 265 Of course, courts ask the same
questions when analyzing the commercial strength of an initially
descriptive mark or the commercial strength of an inherently
distinctive mark. 266 Judicial efficiency itself is no ground to deny
protection to descriptive marks.
Other scholars criticize descriptive marks because the descriptive
term propertized is irrevocably public, whether or not that descriptive
term also comes to carry a secondary, source signifying meaning.
Descriptive marks don’t have the creative bona fides of even the lowly
suggestive mark, and as Lisa Ramsey notes, they never entirely shake
their initial descriptive sense. 267 Maya Alexandri recognizes that the
mark owner must labor to acquire secondary meaning in descriptive
marks, but discounts that labor, on the ground that it requires no
labor to initially “capture” a descriptive mark. 268 Alexandri fails to
recognize that prior to the acquisition of secondary meaning, the
descriptive mark has not been “captured” at all, just like real
property has not been acquired via adverse possession until
265. Alexandri, supra note 183, at 347.
266. See supra Part II.A; notes 33–35 and accompanying text.
267. See Lisa P. Ramsey, Descriptive Trademarks and the First Amendment,
70 Tenn. L. Rev. 1095, 1147 (2003) (“[D]escriptive terms used as
marks do not immediately signal a brand of a product because they do
not lose their original or ‘primary’ descriptive meaning when used as a
mark.”); see also Alexandri, supra note 183, at 348 (discussing the
benefits of eliminating descriptive trademarks).
268. Alexandri, supra note 183, at 357.
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productive use has occurred on the property for the entire duration of
the statutory period. And while a descriptive mark never entirely
loses its initial descriptive meaning, this is different from suggestive or
even arbitrary marks as a matter of degree, not kind. Every mark
except a fanciful mark has some preexisting meaning. 269 Descriptive
marks are protected only when the source-signifying meaning becomes
the most prominent meaning, that is, when the public sees the mark
as signifying goods or services from a unique source. These criticisms
fail because they incorrectly identify the point of “capture” for the
descriptive mark. This temptation is understandable, of course,
because the easiest thing to know about a descriptive mark is when it
was first used. It is harder to know when the mark has acquired
distinctiveness until one litigates the case.
Descriptive marks have also been criticized because of a suspicion
that the USPTO often fails to deny registration for descriptive terms
that fail to acquire secondary meaning, 270 particularly in the context
of section 2(f) applications to register a mark and section 15 affidavits
to establish incontestability. For example, Suman Naresh considers
the possibility that incontestability might be justified by a societal
interest in settling claims (one of the rationales identified earlier to
support adverse possession), 271 but concludes that the public cannot
consent to the acquisition of an incontestable mark through its
collective inaction because there is no well-placed public actor to
oppose the march to incontestability. 272
Recent controversies in the news highlight, however, that
neighbors often raise a hue and cry when they detect adverse
269. See supra notes 29–30, 111, 113–114, 135–137 and accompanying text.
270. See, e.g., Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 211
(1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing the congressional intent
relating to descriptive trademarks); Naresh, supra note 6, at 982–91
(discussing in detail incontestability and adverse possession).
271. See supra notes 48–51 and accompanying text.
272. See Naresh, supra note 6, at 988–89 (finding the visibility of the process
by which the mark becomes incontestable insufficient to support
property rights, because unilateral activity is not binding unless the
public consents). This position leads to problematic paralysis. Both
John Locke and his forgotten foil, Robert Filmer, realized centuries ago
that express consent was difficult to come by. As Alan Ryan summarized: “Long before we had secured the unanimous agreement of the
world’s inhabitants to our taking a mouthful of water, we should have
perished of thirst.” Alan Ryan, Property and Political Theory 17
(1984). Filmer argued that no one could own or use anything if she had
to acquire explicit consent from the rest of humanity. Id. at 16–17
(citing Robert Filmer, Patriarcha (London, 1680)). Locke
responded to the consent conundrum by arguing that individuals
“acquire a title to what they need by mixing their labor with the things
they acquire.” Id. at 17 (citing Locke, supra note 57, at 306–07).
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possession, and this activity drastically increases the odds that the
title owner will be on notice of the attempted acquisition. 273 In the
trademark context, the public is actually empowered to do something,
as discussed in detail in Part III. Public use will pull a mark into ex
post genericness or prevent descriptive terms from acquiring
distinctiveness if the public has begun or proceeds to use the mark
predominantly in its descriptive sense. 274 Likewise, a competitor can
successfully oppose registration of a mark that the competitor needs
to use descriptively in its business, or for which the putative mark
owner has not acquired distinctiveness. 275 The five years required
between a successful section 2(f) application and the section 15
affidavit of incontestability provides competitors an even longer
window to challenge the problematic mark. The public and potential
competitors acquiesce every time an adverse possessor acquires title
without objection and every time the trademark owner acquires
protection in a descriptive mark unopposed. If ten or more years pass
by and no one says anything, the silence itself may be telling.
Here, Eduardo Peñalver and Sonia Katyal’s perceptive take on
risk and reward is helpful. The uncertainty faced by the adverse
possessor signals how much she values the property. 276 Likewise, the
putative owner of a “descriptive mark” signals how much she values
the mark by her willingness to take on such an uncertain proposition.
In order for a descriptive mark to become incontestable, the mark
owner must get past potential competitors on two different levels.
First, the mark must acquire distinctiveness, which the USPTO
presumes can occur in many cases within five years. Then, the
registration must remain effectively unopposed for an additional five
years. If the mark owner passes both barriers, she will do so at least
in part because neither the public nor competitors see enough value in
other potential meanings to challenge the mark owner’s claimed
meaning over an extended period of time. 277
273. Casey Norton, Stranger Moves into Foreclosed Home, Citing Little-Known
Texas Law, KHOU (July 15, 2011, 6:43 AM), http://www.khou.com/home/
Stranger-moves-into-foreclosed-home-citing-little-knownTexas-law.html.
274. See supra notes 175–179 and accompanying text.
275. Both competitive need and skepticism about claimed secondary meaning
may have motivated Continental Airlines to oppose United Airlines’
application to register E-TICKET for computerized reservation and
ticketing of transportation services. Cont’l Airlines Inc. v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (T.T.A.B. 1999).
276. See supra notes 62–63 and accompanying text. Lee Anne Fennell’s goal of
limiting adverse possession to those cases where there is a clear signal of
greater value of the property in the hands of the adverse possessor is also
consistent with this rationale. See Fennel, supra note 49, at 1039–41.
277. But see Jess Gupta, Comment, Descriptive Trademarks and the
Assumption of Risk, 45 U.S.F. L. Rev. 811, 812 (2011) (“[A] person or
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There is some cost to competitors to follow trademark
registrations, check USPTO publications, and watch for competition
in the marketplace. The willingness of competitors to engage in such
work is a signal that tells us how much, if at all, they value the
putative mark, either as a source signifier for their own goods, or
merely to describe their products or services. Competitor interest in
turn is a proxy for whether it is necessary to use the symbol to
communicate with consumers, or whether there might be multiple
ways to communicate with consumers. It may also suggest that
consumers identify the mark as designating a source for the owner’s
goods and services. 278 Thus, the effort it takes to secure rights in the
descriptive mark over time is itself information forcing in the same
way that adverse possession is information forcing. 279
In this light, incontestability for descriptive marks seems less
problematic if a competitor who needs access to the descriptive term
will encounter the mark early enough to thwart the initial registration
of a descriptive mark by either challenging the section 2(f) affidavit of
acquired secondary meaning, 280 or challenging the mark prior to
incontestability. Ten or more years of silence thus operate like an
adverse possession window that not only settles the mark owner’s
claim to the rights that come with incontestability, but also sends a
signal “to all the world” about the value that the mark owner,
competitors, and the public place on the mark.
More generally, granting benefits to registrants is consistent with
the notice function of productive use, but the notice function of
registration is not strong enough to make registration alone sufficient
to secure protection in a trademark. There is a danger that, if the
USPTO rubber-stamps incontestable registrations based solely on the
section 15 affidavit, incontestability will protect some marks that do
not fulfill a notice function and where the mark owner has not, in
fact, successfully transformed the mark into a symbol that
communicates a consistent source of goods and services to consumer.
Fortunately, most courts are sensitive to this issue and inquire about
the commercial strength of incontestable marks before allowing the
business that chooses to affix a descriptive mark to goods or services
assumes the risk of weaker protection for that mark.”).
278. See generally Thomas R. Lee, Eric D. DeRosia & Glenn L. Christensen,
An Empirical and Consumer Psychology Analysis of Trademark
Distinctiveness, 41 Ariz. St. L.J. 1033 (2009) (reporting that survey
participants recognized a descriptive term presented as a trademark on
product packaging as a source signifier with roughly the same frequency
as they recognized “inherently distinctive” terms as trademarks, while
generic terms were typically not perceived as trademarks).
279. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
280. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (2006).
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owner of the incontestable registration to enjoin the activities of
competitors. 281 The commercial strength inquiry thus operates as a
backstop to ensure a sufficient level of productive use. Those courts
that persist in treating incontestable registrations as presumptively
strong, without evidence of secondary meaning or commercial
strength, 282 should reconsider.
Recognizing the productive use rationale may also require some
remedial action by the USPTO and Congress. Currently, the policy
with regards to a section 15 affidavit is neither to examine nor accept
the affidavit. 283 The office merely reviews the affidavit to make sure it
meets statutory requirements on its face. Those requirements include
a statement that the mark has been used in commerce, there are no
final decisions adverse to the owner’s claim of ownership, and there
are no pending proceedings against the mark. 284 The USPTO and its
examiners should, and can, do more. As discussed above, 285 examiners
are instructed to consider the amount of time it might reasonably
take for different types of marks to acquire distinctiveness. Those
types of marks less likely to serve an independent notice function are
subject to increased scrutiny before the Examiner will grant a
section 2(f) Application to register a descriptive mark.
The same scrutiny could be applied to section 15 affidavits. Given
that inherently distinctive marks more naturally fulfill the notice
function of productive use, it would be consistent with the productive
use framework, and reasonable as a matter of judicial efficiency, to
limit an in-depth inquiry to section 15 affidavits for descriptive
marks. 286 Those marks are less likely to have acquired significant
281. See, e.g., Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon, Inc. v. Alpha of Va., Inc., 43
F.3d 922, 933–35 (4th Cir. 1995) (analyzing case law and rejecting the
presumption that an incontestable mark has acquired commercial
strength).
282. See Wynn Oil Co. v. Am. Way Serv. Corp., 943 F.2d 595, 600 (6th Cir.
1991) (“Since Wynn’s mark had been registered over five years without
being contested, it was presumptively strong.”); Dieter v. B & H Indus.
of Sw. Fla., 880 F.2d 322, 329 (11th Cir. 1989) (“Because Dieter’s mark
is incontestable, then it is presumed to be at least descriptive with
secondary meaning, and therefore a relatively strong mark.”).
283. Maintain/Renew a Registration: How to Keep Registration Alive, U.S.
Patent & Trademark Off., http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/process/
maintain/prfaq.jsp (last modified Aug. 21, 2012, 7:53 AM) (“The USPTO
neither examines the merits of § 15 Declarations nor ‘accepts’ § 15
Declarations.”).
284. Id.
285. See supra notes 101–103 and accompanying text.
286. One could further narrow the inquiry by focusing on only those marks
registered pursuant to section 2(f) of the Lanham Act. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1052(f) (2006).
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levels of commercial strength, and the close review of affidavits to
register those marks will likely prevent much of the perceived
problem. 287
B.

Crystallizing Trademark Timelines

One possible reform stemming from the productive use analysis is
to get serious about crystallizing trademark rights. 288 Crystallizing the
length of time required to acquire secondary meaning or commercial
strength would provide some certainty for the mark owner, at least as
to the amount of time she has to bring the mark up to a sufficient
level of commercial productivity. It could also provide some certainty
for the public and potential competitors.
It might be difficult to create a one-size-fits-all secondary meaning
window, but consider the result if we treated the section 2(f)
presumption that a descriptive term acquires secondary meaning and
can be registered after five years of substantially continuous and
exclusive use as a hard floor for the amount of time required to secure
secondary meaning in a descriptive mark. The public and competitors
would know that the owner must use the mark in commerce for a
minimum of five years before the mark could be effectively enforced
against arguable infringers. If descriptive marks are troubling because
they are derived from broad, descriptive terms needed for
competition, then the hard floor might do a better job preserving
space for competitors and the public to make productive use of a
given descriptive term, up through the last day of the five year
period. Such a regime might disincentivize the adoption of descriptive
marks closer to the suggestive line, for which the mark owner could
otherwise establish secondary meaning in less than five years, and
those may be the wrong descriptive marks to discourage. But to the
extent that we think the public benefits when competitors utilize
descriptive terms without the permission of prior users, the harm to
the trademark owner created by such a floor might be offset by
broadening the catalogue of marks that effectively remain in the
public domain for descriptive use.
There is a danger inherent in crystallization, however. This same
five-year window could be crystallized in a way that favors mark
owners. The five-year window could be treated as a safe harbor for
mark owners who adopt inherently distinctive marks. For the first five
years, courts would presume the inherently strong mark was also
commercially strong. Thus, so long as the mark reaches a reasonable
level of commercial strength within five years, the mark would be
287. See supra note 126.
288. See discussion supra Part IV.D regarding how crystalline and muddy
property rules manifest in the adverse possession and trademark
regimes.
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presumed strong, and likely to prevail more often in infringement
suits. 289 Finally, one potentially costly result of either crystallization is
that courts would be required to determine whether a mark was
descriptive or suggestive—which is notoriously difficult 290—because
the five-year floor would cut in favor of the inherently strong,
suggestive mark but against the inherently weak, descriptive mark. 291
Consider a second possible crystallization: if more frequent
abandonment of trademarks for nonuse is in the public interest, we
might stiffen the abandonment test outlined in section 45 of the
Lanham Act. 292 Currently, the presumption that the mark is
abandoned after three years of nonuse is easily overcome by evidence
that the mark owner intends to resume use—a fairly low standard. 293
Instead of treating three years of nonuse as prima facie evidence of
abandonment, we could treat it as conclusive evidence of
abandonment.
Carol Rose posits that courts tend to muddy crystalline rules to
prevent forfeiture and protect sympathetic parties from the
consequences of their bargains. 294 Therefore, it would not be surprising

289. Cf. Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Time: A Proposal, 101 Mich. L. Rev.
409, 464 (2002) (proposing that copyright’s fair use analysis should be
sensitive to how long the copyrighted work has been around, and
perhaps protect younger works more robustly than older works).
290. See, e.g., BigStar Entm’t, Inc. v. Next Big Star, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 2d
185, 198–202 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (musing that “the vague boundary that
divides suggestive and descriptive terms” has “bedeviled many . . .
judges”).
291. See, e.g., Valmor Prods. Co. v. Standard Prods. Corp., 464 F.2d 200,
202 (1st Cir. 1972) (concluding that while a laudatory mark was likely
suggestive, it didn’t matter because forty-five years of advertising was
sufficient to establish “a close connection between the trademark name
and its products” (quoting district court below)).
292. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) (defining “abandonment”).
293. See, e.g., Zelinski v. Columbia 300, Inc. 335 F.3d 633, 639 (7th Cir.
2003) (mark owner can rebut the presumption of abandonment by
“demonstrating the lack of an intent not to resume use,” and did so by
discussing the production of his branded bowling balls with two other
companies (quoting Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978
F.2d 947, 955 (7th Cir. 1992))).
294. Rose, Crystals, supra note 15, at 597–98. There is evidence of this
tendency in other intellectual property contexts. Cf. Andrew Gilden,
Copyright Essentialism and the Performativity of Remedies, 54 Wm. &
Mary L. Rev. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 24–25), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2121938 (arguing that courts refrain from
finding infringement in order to avoid granting an “unworkable
remedy”); Jake Linford, A Second Look at the Right of First
Publication, 58 J. Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. 585, 604–10 (2011) (noting
that courts crafted the concept of limited publication in part to avoid
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to see courts act in like manner when faced with a floor for the
acquisition of secondary meaning, the loss of acquired strength, or a
bright-line abandonment rule. 295 Thus, if Congress embraces the
challenge to create more crystalline timelines in the Lanham Act, it
may need to clearly bar any “muddying” of those timelines by courts.
C.

Adverse Possession: Productive Use over Bad Faith

Finally, as discussed briefly in Part II.B, courts and scholars are
in disagreement about whether an adverse possessor must also show a
particular intent to possess property either innocently (in “good
faith”) or intentionally (in “bad faith”). 296 Whether or not to consider
an adverse possessor’s subjective intent has devoured a great deal of
intellectual oxygen. 297 Scholars have questioned whether we should
treat good faith adverse possessors more preferentially than bad faith
adverse possessors, 298 and whether courts actually favor good faith
adverse possessors, regardless of what a given statute or judge-made
test might say about the claim of right. 299
the harsh consequences of finding a copyrighted work had been
published without proper notice and thus fell into the public domain).
295. We actually see such resistance to even the soft abandonment rule
currently in place. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Gibraltar Fin.
Corp. of Cal., 694 F.2d 1150, 1156 (9th Cir. 1982) (“Abandonment of
a trademark, being in the nature of a forfeiture, must be strictly
proved.”).
296. Singer, supra note 20, § 4.2.5 at 151–52.
297. See, e.g., id. § 4.2.5 at 151 (“Of all the elements of adverse possession,
the adversity requirement has given rise to the most confused and
varied treatment.”).
298. Compare Richard A. Epstein, Past and Future: The Temporal
Dimension in the Law of Property, 64 Wash. U. L.Q. 667, 687–88
(1986) (suggesting a two-tiered adverse possession statute of limitations,
shorter for good faith possessors and longer for bad faith possessors),
with Fennell, supra note 49, at 1039–41 (arguing that only those “bad
faith” adverse possessors who can show they would have paid for the
property in question, and thus are possessing only to correct an
apparent market failure, should be allowed to adversely possess the
property).
299. Richard Helmholz has argued, based on his historical analysis of adverse
possession cases, that whether or not courts explicitly acknowledge it,
they favor the claims of good faith adverse possessors. R.H. Helmholz,
Adverse Possession and Subjective Intent, 61 Wash. U. L.Q. 331, 331–
32 (1983). But see Roger A. Cunningham, Adverse Possession and
Subjective Intent: A Reply to Professor Helmholz, 64 Wash U. L.Q. 1,
2–3 (1986) (“Professor Helmholz’s conclusions differ so greatly from
generally accepted views as to justify a careful look at the cases on
which he based his conclusions.” (footnote omitted)). And for a response
to Professor Cunningham, see Helmholz, supra note 25. I find Professor
Helmholz’s description persuasive. Nevertheless, the majority rule has
not changed in the intervening years.
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Under the majority rule in the United States, intent with regard
to the record owner is irrelevant. 300 So long as the adverse possessor
treats the property as her own, it is irrelevant whether she knows it is
not her property or whether she intends to wrest it from the record
owner via adverse possession. This standard is consistent with the
notice function account. It is “the visible and adverse possession, with
an intention to possess,” one early court decision concluded, “that
constitutes its adverse character, and not the remote views or belief of
the possessor.” 301
Understanding that adverse possession is justified by the notice
function of productive use helps clarify that we should favor good
faith or bad faith possession only to the extent that one type of
possession provides better notice to the public. Perhaps intent serves
as a proxy for other issues bothering courts. Good faith or innocent
adverse possession is often attributed to border-adjusting encroachments between neighbors, but that encroachment looks the same to
the world and to the record owner whether the adverse possessor is
aware of the property lines or not. Likewise, occupying property that
is not coterminous with the adverse possessor’s other parcels can
quickly put the public and the sufficiently attentive record owner on
notice, whether or not the adverse possessor knows or cares that there
is another record holder.
In other words, we should stop worrying about good faith versus
bad faith adverse possession—and stop setting different time periods
300. Singer, supra note 20, § 4.2.5, at 155. Other jurisdictions adopt
different approaches. A handful of jurisdictions have enacted the
mistaken possession rule, under which only the good faith or mistaken
adverse possessor may prevail. See, e.g., N.M. Stat. § 37-1-22. Some
jurisdictions require the possessor to establish her subjective state of
mind via her objective acts. Singer, supra note 20, § 4.2.5, at 154.
Other jurisdictions follow an intentional dispossession rule (also known
as the Maine rule) under which only the adverse possessor with “bad
faith,” that is, the intent to dispossess, may prevail. See, e.g., Petsch v.
Widger, 335 N.W.2d 254, 260 (Neb. 1983) (“In Nebraska, intent to
assert ownership of the property is a requirement of adverse
possession . . . .”); Preble v. Me. Cent. RR. Co., 27 A. 149, 150 (Me.
1893). While the intentional dispossession rule has been roundly
criticized, it has at least one champion in Lee Anne Fennell, who asserts
it is the only efficient foundation for an adverse possession regime.
Compare Smith v. Tippett, 569 A.2d 1186, 1191 (D.C. 1990) (“To limit
the doctrine of adverse possession to the latter type places a premium
on intentional wrongdoing, contrary to fundamental justice and policy.”
(quoting 7 R. Powell, The Law of Real Property § 1013(2), at 9–
33 (Rev. ed. 1989) now found in 16 Richard R. Powell, Powell on
Real Property § 91.05[3] (Michael Allan Wolf ed. 2000))), with
Fennell, supra note 49, at 1039–41 (explaining how adverse possession
should be redesigned to require that an individual be aware of the
trespass).
301. French v. Pearce, 8 Conn. 439, 443 (1831).
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for good faith and bad faith adverse possessors 302—because there is
nothing inherently communicative about the intent of the adverse
possessor. We might nevertheless value the possessor who occupies
with color of title and records the title, 303 not because she is a “good
faith” purchaser, but because the purchase, and the record of it, puts
us on better notice of her claim.

Conclusion
This Article uncovers the productive use requirement and the
notice function underlying both the trademark and adverse possession
acquisition regimes. In light of the similar policy needs shaping the
two regimes, both regimes can merit from a move toward more clearly
requiring notifying, productive use as a prerequisite to the acquisition
of rights. That insight provided an opening to explore the shifting
states between crystalline and muddy property rights in the
trademark system and the malleable boundaries between the property
rights held by trademark owners and the public in common. These
discussions inform the core intervention, suggesting that some
crystallization of trademark rights, particularly the time needed to
acquire secondary meaning and the time after which a mark might be
deemed abandoned, might benefit public and competitive uses by
clarifying when rights in a trademark lexeme might shift back to the
public. More generally, this project highlights the importance of
resisting the temptation either to seek a unified field theory of
property rights governing real, personal, and intellectual property, or
to entirely reject analogies between property regimes. As we see when
contrasting trademark acquisition and adverse possession, a close look
at the critical features of the right regimes can pay unexpected
dividends.

302. A handful of states favor the innocent adverse possessor by allowing
them to secure title by possessing for a shorter statutory period, a model
championed by Richard Epstein. Compare La. Civ. Code Ann. arts.
3473, 3475 (ten-year prescription period for good faith possessor), with
art. 3486 (thirty-year period for bad faith possessor). Thomas Merrill
argues instead that the innocent adverse possessor should acquire a
property right, but the bad faith adverse possessor should acquire only a
liability right, which would allow her to purchase from the record owner
at market value. Merrill, supra note 51, at 1145.
303. See supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text.
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